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3 “Old is Gold!” Madhusūdana Sarasvatī’s Way 4 of Referring to Earlier Textual Tradition

5 Gianni Pellegrini

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8 **Abstract** Madhusūdana Sarasvatī wrote several treatises on Advaita philosophy.
9 His *magnum opus* is the *Advaitasiddhi*, written in order to reply to the keen
10 objections moved by the Dvaitin Vyāsātīrtha’s *Nyāyāmṛta*. *Advaitasiddhi* is verily a
11 turning point into the galaxy of Vedānta, not only as far as its replies are concerned,
12 but also for the reutilization of earlier vedāntic material and its reformulation by
13 means of the highly sophisticated language of the new school of logic. This article is
14 an attempt to contextualize Madhusūdana’s works in a broader context through
15 three looking glasses: (1) the analysis of how Madhusūdana refers to his own works,
16 in order to reconstruct a relative chronology among them; (2) Madhusūdana’s
17 adherence to the tenets of the previous Advaita tradition, how much he is indebted
18 to Vyāsātīrtha, how he quotes him and how he replies to him; (3) Madhusūdana’s
19 acquaintance with other textual traditions, mainly Vyākaraṇa, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and
20 Nyāya.

21

22 **Keywords** Advaita Vedānta · Madhusūdana Sarasvatī · *Advaitasiddhi* ·
23 Reverse indebtedness · Vyāsātīrtha · Textual reuse

Abbreviations Not Contained in the Bibliography

- 24 PM *Pramāṇamālā*
25 BG *Bhagavadgītā*
26 BS *Brahmasūtra*
27 BrU *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*
28 MS *Madhusūdana Sarasvatī*
29 LC *Laghucandrikā*
30 VT *Vyāsa Tīrtha*
31 SSSS *Samkṣepaśārīrakasārasaṃgraha*

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32 Structure and Finalities

33 This contribution deals with a philosophical network among philosophers, mainly
34 focusing on Advaita Vedānta as interpreted by one of the greatest *ācāryas* of the
35 pre-modern era: Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (hereafter MS). Through the looking glass
36 of his masterpiece, the *Advaitasiddhi* (hereafter AS) and his other minor works, I
37 shall try to work out a general understanding of how Advaita authors of that period
38 used diversified materials in their works.

39 In MS's textual production there is a huge quantity of quotations, acknowledged
40 and not acknowledged references, hints and presuppositions. In this article I shall
41 highlight three layers of material used by MS:

- 42 (1) Cross-references: MS's quotations, references and hints at his own works;
- 43 (2) Quotations from Advaita material: reference, defence, re-evaluation and
44 reformulation of earlier authors' statements, adherence to the textual tradition
45 because quoting and referring to previous *ācāryas* strengthens one's own
46 position;
- 47 (3) Other schools' material: replies to the Dvaita *Nyāyāmṛta* and references
48 (acknowledged or unacknowledged) to texts or doctrines of other schools.

50 In the works of MS we easily feel his continuous attempt to interpret the efforts
51 of earlier Advaita *ācāryas* towards a common and unique aim, which is epitomized
52 in the title of his *magnum opus*: *Advaitasiddhi*. Apart from the first two sections of
53 this article, the rest of the analysis is thus especially focused on AS and his relation
54 with earlier sources. In order to better put in context MS's works, the first section is
55 an introduction dedicated to drawing a preliminary sketch of the historical and
56 cultural period, beginning with the emergence of the Navya Nyāya style and its
57 capillary diffusion, the long lasting debate between Dvaita and Advaita,
58 Vyāsatīrtha's (henceforth VT) utilization of *navya* style to demolish Advaita
59 positions, the consequent reply by MS and his adaptation of Advaita tenets to Navya
60 Nyāya technical terminology.

61 The second section is a survey on MS's works (case (1) above). It attempts to
62 establish a relative chronology among them and investigate how MS used his own
63 writings in others works. One notices that MS rarely copied and pasted passages or
64 discussions from one text to another. If this happens, it is just in the earlier stages of his
65 production. Many discussions are repeated, when but their subject is the same.
66 However, whenever MS approaches some issue already treated elsewhere, he simply
67 cross-refers and, closing the parenthesis, sends the reader to his own other text. Even
68 when dealing with similar issues, there is a precise differentiating balance which leads
69 to implementing his discussion with ever new materials, discussions and vocabulary.
70 As pointed out by Torella (2011, pp. 178–179) concerning the various recipients of
71 Abhinavagupta's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvr̥tti* and *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛtivismar̥sinī*,
72 MS's works are different because of their different *adhikārin*s.

73 The third section of this article is devoted to a rapid glance at Advaita literature
74 and MS's extensive knowledge of it (case (2)). To discharge the previous *ācāryas*
75 from the objections of VT, MS is compelled to quote many passages by VT. In fact,
76 polemical texts like AS are constructed following an established pattern so that they



are primarily focused on refuting opponents in extremely technical terms (this constitutes a “reverse indebtedness”, see *infra*, Sect. IV.1). This, of course, presupposes a great textual expertise on the part of the recipient of the text, because the authors only give some clues about discussions held elsewhere and leave their recollection to the scholarly background of the readers. The last section is a rudimental attempt to show how much MS is acquainted with and how he re-uses other *śāstras* (case (3)).

I will also attempt to show how the later Advaita way of referring and quoting is apparently quite far from the modern concept of plagiarism.¹ In AS we find many features and expressive modalities shared with other *śāstras*, but expressed in Vedāntic terms. For instance, we deal with *verbatim* quotations from *Upaṇiṣads* (see UP), re-propositions *verbatim* and *ad sensum* of well-known Advaitic doctrines and references from earlier *ācāryas* (see Conclusions).

I Contextualization

From the X–XI century onwards, Advaitins shifted their attention to a different referent for their attacks and confutations, mainly the Naiyāyikas and later on the realist schools of Vedānta, whereas the previous adversaries like Sāṃkhyas and Buddhists were just nominally inserted into the debates (Deshpande 1997, p. 460, n. 15). This trend is witnessed by texts of the calibre of *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya* (hereafter KKK) of Śrīharṣa (XII century) and *Tattvaprādīpikā* (or *Citsukhī*, hereafter TP) of Citsukha Muṇi (1220 ca., Potter 2006, p. 602; XIII CE, Sharma 1974, pp. 1–4; Divanji 1933, pp. CVIII–CX), which vehemently and sophisticatedly questioned Naiyāyikas’ positions.

The Dvaita school of Vedānta emerged between the XIII and the XIV century, due to Madhva’s work (or Ānanda Tīrtha, 1238–1317, Sharma 1981, pp. 77–79).² In his writings, in particular in his *Anuvyākhyāna* commentary on *Brahmasūtra* (hereafter BS), Madhva vehemently addressed the Advaitins and their *siddhāntas* as the main adversaries, consequently directing the dialectical dispute with the Naiyāyikas towards other frontiers. After Madhva comes an early stage of development of dualist writings, culminating in the “standardization of Dvaita thought” (Sharma 1981, p. 235) under the encyclopaedic genius of Jaya Tīrtha (1365–1388, Sharma 1981, p. 245).³ This author won the title of *ṭīkācārya* for the

¹ See, in this volume, Doctor (section 5.1) and Neri (Conclusions).

² According to Dasgupta, who significantly anticipates the dates of this author, Madhva was born in 1197 (IV, 1991, p. 52). After entering *saṃnyāsa*, he became the head of the Aṣṭa Maṭha of Uḍipi. As *ācārya* of Dvaita Vedānta, he focused his keen refutation of Śaṃkara and his direct disciples, Sureśvara (IX cen.) and Padmapāda (IX cen.), as well as later important Advaita authors (Dasgupta 1991, p. 104) such as Sarvajñātman (between the end of the IX cen. and the beginning of the X cen.), Vācaspati Miśra (X cen.) and Vimuktātman (XI cen.).

³ Following Dasgupta (1991, pp. 93–94), Jaya Tīrtha was a disciple of Akṣobhya Tīrtha (1230–1247), pupil and successor of Padmanātha Tīrtha (after Narahari Tīrtha, 1204–1213, and Mādhava Tīrtha, 1214–1230), a direct disciple and head of the Maṭha after Madhva (1197–1204). Jaya Tīrtha headed the Maṭha from 1247 to 1268.



Nyāyasudhā, a highly sophisticated sub-commentary on Madhva's *Anuvyākhyāna*.⁴ In the fourth generation of disciples departing from Jaya Tīrtha comes Vyāsa Tīrtha (hereafter VT, 1478–1539)⁵ whose *magnum opus*, the *Nyāyāmṛta* (hereafter NA), is undoubtedly one of the most outstanding treatises of the Indian philosophical horizon. The Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Vedānta was also widely present in the debate with both the other schools, lasting from the XI to the XVIII century.

Let us now leave the Dvaita thinkers for a while and briefly glance at the new linguistic and philosophical tendencies of that pre-modern period. In the Mithilā region a new (*navya*) methodologically precise way of expression arose. It was a new rigorous philosophical style: the New Logic (Navya Nyāya), which was a system of philosophical analysis arisen from the combination of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. This school developed a technical language which became the standard idiom for academic works in Sanskrit, not only in the systems of philosophy, but in grammar, poetics and law. Even though the beginnings of this new school were already visible in Udayana's writings (X century), the truly innovative output has been assumed to be in Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya's (1320, Potter et al. 1993, pp. 85–86; XIII century, Ingalls 1988, pp. 4–6; 1325, Matilal 1977, p. 105) *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (hereafter TC). Although in the period separating Udayana and Gaṅgeśa⁶ the process by which the new logic penetrated the usage of other systems was slow, it was nevertheless inexorable. In fact, it caught the entire Indian philosophical panorama within the span of two or three centuries, becoming an essential tool of precision in both written and oral debates. Having tested the important and innovative accomplishments of the logicians, all the other systems were obliged to adjust their formulation to this kind of idiom. The adoption of Navya Nyāya terminology in the late pre-modern Indian philosophy provided a new common conceptual vocabulary, so that the debaters became able to mutually understand each other. This process continued in the traditional training of Sanskrit scholars.

Bronkhorst et al. (2013)⁷ recently have tried to identify the point in which the *navya* style penetrated the scholarly tradition of Vārāṇasī. According to their research it seems that in the early years of the formation of Navya Nyāya, precisely from Gaṅgeśa to Pakṣadhara (alias Jayadeva) Miśra (last part of the XV century,

⁴ Sharma (1981, p. 252) refers to the views quoted and refuted by Jaya Tīrtha in the *Nyāyasudhā*, where Śaṅkara's, Bhāskara's, Rāmānuja's and Yādavaprakāśa's commentaries on BS were subject to severe criticism. Even the sub-commentators were not spared, like Padmapāda, Vācaspati, Prakāśātman (XI CE; Divanji 1933, pp. CVII–CVIII) and Amalānanda Sarasvatī (XIII cen.), author of *Kalpataru*, a gloss on Vācaspati's *Bhāmātī*. Jaya Tīrtha attacks also *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, *Tattvabindu*, *Nyāyakusumañjalī*, *Nyāyavārtikatātparyāñikā*, *Khaṇḍanakhāṇḍakhāḍya*, *Tattvapradīpikā*, *Mānamānōhara*, *Nyāyalīlāvatī*, Gaṅgeśa, Bhasarvajña, Praśastapāda, Śrīdhara's *Nyāyakandalī*, Vyomaśiva, Kumārila and Prabhākara as well as the *sphoṭavādins*. It is likely that Vidyāranya (XIV cen.) and Jaya Tīrtha's *guru*, Akṣobhya Tīrtha, were contemporaries, meaning Jaya Tīrtha was slightly younger than Vidyāranya. There are also some textual evidences according to which they met (Sharma 1981, pp. 248–249).

⁵ The date accepted here is the one proposed by Sharma (1981, p. 286), one of the leading scholars of Dvaita Vedānta. Again Sharma (1981, p. 237) quotes a verse from *Śrīmuṣṇamāhātmya*, where Madhva, Jaya Tīrtha and Vyāsa Tīrtha bearing the title *munitraya* are said to be the utmost authorities of Dvaita Vedānta. According to Deepak Sharma, Vyāsa Tīrtha's birth can be placed 18 years before: 1460–1539 (2003, p. 17).

⁶ For further details see Bhattacharya (1987, pp. 1–7).

⁷ I would like to thank Professor Bronkhorst for sending me his article before its publication.



Kaviraj 1961, p. 35; Ingalls 1988, pp. 6–9), the technical language of Navya Nyāya remained confined to Mithilā where the indigenous *paṇḍitas* monopolized its teaching and transmission so as to secure their undisputed leadership on it (Bronkhorst et al. 2013, pp. 73–75).⁸ But, this jealous attitude towards *navya* language and methodology contrasts with its spread all over India.⁹ In order to answer to this oddity, the three scholars affirm that “broadly speaking, it looks as if the journey of Navya-Nyāya techniques from Mithilā to Varanasi” passed through Vijayanagara.¹⁰ VT lived as royal preceptor in Vijayanagara, first hosted by the Sāḷuva dynasty (1485–1505) and, later, by the Tuluva dynasty (1505–1570).¹¹

Controversies between Dvatins and Advatins occupy a pivotal position in the history of Indian philosophy. VT's NA has been considered the most colossal attack to the very basis of Advaita, such as the notions of *avidyā*, of superimposition (*adhyāsa*), falsity of the world (*mithyātva*), etc. In its four chapters, while clearly presenting the opponents views, VT shows his deep learning in all the *śāstras*: beside Nyāya and various schools of Vedānta, he was particularly proficient in Mīmāṃsā, Vyākaraṇa as well as Vedic “philology”. To each and every Advaitins' position he replies using a highly sophisticated Navya Naiyāyika style, pointing out all the weaknesses, shortcomings and fallacies of his adversaries. NA seriously mined the entire doctrinal building of *kevalādvaitavāda* (Gupta 2006, pp. 11–12).

After NA's ponderous attack on Advaita the *Advaitaṭīpikā* and *Bhedadikkāra* of Narasimhāśrama or Nṛsimhāśrama (middle of the XVI century; NC, Sastri-Sastri 1959, pp. 47–48) or Appayya Dīkṣita's *Mādhvamatavidhvamsana* with its own commentary *Mādhvamatamukhamardana* or *Mādhvamatamukhabhaṅga* (Sharma

⁸ The above-mentioned scholars quote an interesting, even if partially unsupported, note of Kaviraj (1961, p. 36, n. 5), which suggests the attitude of Mithilā towards Navya Nyāya. According to Kaviraj, the manuscripts of Nyāya works produced in Mithilā were not allowed to leave the city or to be copied. Thus the “students had to commit text to memory” and later on were examined by their teachers. He adds that, since the expertise and diploma gained from Mithilā were guarantees of pan-Indian recognition, a lot of students used to go there to learn the new techniques (Bronkhorst et al. 2013, pp. 73–74).

⁹ It is important to specify that this “confinement” of Navya Nyāya lasted until the arrival in Mithilā of the Bengali Raghunātha Siromaṇi (ca. 1510), whose effort greatly helped the new logic to spread also in its second centre, Navadvīpa in Western Bengal (Potter and Bhattacharya 1993, pp. 3–4). However, the possible link made by Sharma (1981, pp. 291–926) between VT and Vāsudeva Sarvabhauma (1430–1530, Bhattacharya 1976, p. 81), whose commentary on the Lakṣmīdhara Kavi's *Advaitamakaranda* was probably sent for criticism to Vijayanagara after the Kaliṅga war (1516), is also quite interesting. Vāsudeva Sarvabhauma was initially a Navya Naiyāyika disciple of Pakṣadhara (Jayadeva) Miśra (Kaviraj 1961, p. 51) in Mithilā. Later he shifted to Navadvīpa, where he founded a traditional school (*śol*) (Bronkhorst et al. 2013, pp. 80–81) and probably became the *guru* of Raghunātha. Therefore, he seems to be the real founder of the Bengali Navya Nyāya tradition (Bhattacharya 1976, p. 81). Subsequently, Vāsudeva became an Advaitin and then a follower of Caitanya (Potter and Bhattacharya 1993, p. 4).

¹⁰ It is a matter of fact that VT was acquainted with a number of texts from Mithilā, but it is not at all clear in which way he got this knowledge. Following Somanātha's hagiography of VT, the *Īyāsayogicarita*, Bronkhorst et al. offer some hypothetical solutions (2013, pp. 78–79). See also Sharma (1981, pp. 291–296).

¹¹ Clarks (2006, pp. 193–202) deals with the different religious orientation of the Vijayanagara rulers, during the kingdom of the three dynasties, which succeeded each other from the traditional foundation of the city (1336): the Saṅgama (1336–1486), then the Sāḷuva and the Tuluva. The Saṅgama were closely connected with the Śṛṅgerī *maṭha* and especially with Bhārati Tīrtha and Mādhava Vidyāraṇya (Minkowski 2011, p. 219). VT received the highest reputation during the reign of the Tuluva Kṛṣṇadevarāya.



1981, pp. 86–87, 387; Minkowski 2011, p. 210) are still pale attempts to defend the system. By contrast, the most successful defence of Advaita positions has undoubtedly been the AS (Nair 1990, pp. 20–21; Gupta 2006, pp. 11–12). As noted by Minkowski (2011, pp. 212–213), the very tough criticism forced the Advaitins to weaken the rigid separation among the opinions internal to Advaita, perhaps clearly explaining them in anthological compendiums like Appayya Dīkṣita's *Siddhāntaleśasamgraha* (hereafter SLS, see also infra, Sect. III.2). It is possible to assume that “Advaita was rearticulated to become once again the meta-discourse of Indian philosophy, and at the same time to represent the mainstream or properly Vedic view” (Minkowski 2011, p. 223). Thus, with Appayya, MS and then Dharmarāja Adhvarin, a new harmonizing spirit originated among the several branches of Advaita. At the same time, the diffusion of the *navya* style compelled the Advaitins to reformulate their tenets with a new idiom.

This was the intellectual and, consequently, textual panorama in which MS found himself. AS, his *magnum opus*, is highly technical.¹² This text is the result of Advaitins' need to reply to the keen objections moved by the Dvaitin VT's NA to the very doctrinal structure of Advaita. Within the long sequence of propositions and oppositions, which occupied the internal discussion between many schools of Vedānta for at least seven or eight centuries, the AS is verily a turning point.

The importance of MS and his AS is witnessed by the rapidity and vehemence of the reactions it provoked (Freschi's Introduction, Sect. 4.3; Preisendanz 2008, pp. 611–612): a full series of texts is based on the NA-AS polemics (Nair 1990, pp. 21–24).

II MS Refers to His Own Works

II.1 MS

Already in the century preceding the appearance of MS there were several signs of a renewed cultural vigour. The liberal Afghan Muslim ruler of Gauḍa, Alauddin Hussain Shah (1493–1519), greatly patronized learning and the sciences. In this period Nīmāi Paṇḍita was born, subsequently better known as Śrīkṛṣṇa Caitanya (1486–1533/4), founder of the *acintyabhedābheda* current of Vaiṣṇavism, who enormously influenced the Bengali *vaiṣṇava* thought. In 1575, Akbar (1556–1605) defeated Daud Karrani, the last Afghan ruler and included Bengal in his Mughal kingdom, where he left his army chief Mansingh as governor. This also was a period of splendour for Bengal because, along with economic development, the magnanimity of the Mughal king allowed a free religious cult. Caitanya's movement had a broad echo and stimulated Bengali people to undertake pilgrimages to distant *tīrthas*, such as Mathurā-Vṛndāvana, Jagannātha Puri, Kāśī, etc. MS was born and

¹² A less known but decidedly appealing study of M.M. Ānantakṛṣṇa Śāstrī covering a whole issue of *Sarasvatī Suśamā* (1964, pp. 83–178), the journal of the Sanskrit University of Varanasi, discusses *Advaitasiddheḥ śāṅkaravedānte kiṃ sthānam?* This long monographic article is devoted to the disclosure of AS as a defence of Advaita tenets and an extremely precise survey on all its literature.



raised in this period of political stability and great economic, cultural and religious mobility (Saha 2011, pp. 16–18).

It is quite a tough task to determine with a consistent grade of certitude the life of MS, since one has to cope with hagiographical and contradictory information. It seems quite likely that MS was born in Eastern Bengal (in the village Koṭālipādā in the district of Faridpur, now Bangladesh). Several scholars have proposed their own ideas concerning the *floruit* of MS (ca. 1500–1607?) or solutions for his *terminus ante quem* and *terminus post quem*. The most plausible and extensive discussion is found in Divanji (1933, pp. I–XXIX), who evaluates all the earlier attempts and to whom nearly all the later authors refer.¹³ It is accepted that at the early stages of his life MS was known by the birth name Kamalanayana (Divanji 1933, p. XVII). Most probably, MS was a student of the Navya Nyāya school of Navadvīpa, founded by Vāsudeva Sarvabhauma and strengthened by Raghunātha. MS apprehended the *navya* techniques by Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa (according to Gambhirananda [1998, p. 14] he learned Navya Nyāya with Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa [1550]), probably a pupil of Raghunātha himself (Kaviraj 1961, p. 60).¹⁴ This Navya Naiyāyika might be the Śrīrāma mentioned in the second *maṅgala* verse of AS and in the closing verse of MS's commentary on *Bhagavadgītā* (hereafter BG), the *Gūḍārthadīpikā* (Divanji 1933, pp. XIV–XVIII). Or, maybe, the Rāma mentioned in these texts could be Rāma Tīrtha, who is said to be the Advaita teacher of MS at Vārāṇasī.

By the middle of the XV century Caitanya was also living in Navadvīpa.¹⁵ MS was profoundly touched by his teaching and through his mastering Navya Nyāya logical tools he decided to firmly establish the devotional position of Caitanya refuting the non-dualistic point of view. Since in Navadvīpa the teaching of Advaita *darśana* was not allowed, MS moved to Vārāṇasī, which was considered the Advaita headquarter. There, without openly expressing his aim, he started learning Advaita with Rāma Tīrtha and Mīmāṃsā with Mādhava Sarasvatī (and maybe with

¹³ Together with Divanji's, good surveys on MS's date, life and works are Modi (1985, pp. 1–54), Nair (1990), Gupta (2006, pp. 1–13) and Saha (2011, pp. 10–31). For establishing his date it might be useful to mention Viśvanātha Pañcānana's *Bhedasiddhi*, in open polemic with AS, since the same Viśvanātha dated his *Gautamasūtravṛtti* 1556 of the *śaka* era (= 1634 CE) (Gupta 2006, p. 5). Furthermore, among MS's pupils we find Śeṣa Govinda, who calls himself the son of Śeṣa Paṇḍita. If the father of Govinda is held to be identical with the well-known Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa who lived in the XVI century, which is not unlikely, the synchronism of MS with Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa might be established (Kaviraj 1987, p. 156; Gupta 2006, p. 5). Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa was the *guru* of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita (Gambhirananda 1998, pp. 14–15).

¹⁴ A popular verse quoted by all the monographs on MS informs us that he and two great Navya Naiyāyikas, namely Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa (ca. 1600-ca. 1675, Matilal 1977, p. 110) and Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya (between 1604 and 1709; Bhattacharya 1987, pp. 182–183) were contemporaries (even if this is rather unlikely). The verse runs like this: *navadvīpe samāyāte madhusūdanavākpatau / cakampe tarkavāgīśaḥ kātaro 'bhūt gadādharaḥ //*, "When the lord of the speech Madhusūdana reached Navadvīpa, [Mathurānātha] Tarkavāgīśa trembled while Gadādhara [Bhaṭṭācārya] became confused" (Thangaswami 1980, p. 286).

¹⁵ From MS's commentary on Sarvajñātman's *ŚŚ*, the *Samkṣepaśārīrakasārasaṅgraha* (SŚSS) II.51, I.62 and I.220, we know that MS had some contact with Vallabha (1479–1531), the *ācārya* of Śuddhādvaita Vedānta. Moreover, MS and two Gosvāmins of Vṛndāvana, Rūpa Gosvāmin (1554/5) and Jīva Gosvāmin (1578/9), were almost contemporaries. MS's reading of *bhakti* superficially resembles that of the *vaiṣṇava* saints, even if it maintains strong peculiarities and irreducible differences due to a more marked emphasis on non-dualism (Gupta 2006, pp. 122–125).



227 Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa), both disciples of Rāmeśvara Bhaṭṭa.¹⁶ Tradition has it (Saha
228 2011, pp. 20–26) that MS, while studying Advaita, understood the very core of this
229 *darśana* and confessed his previous intention to his teacher. Rāma Tīrtha
230 appreciated and advised MS to enter into *saṃnyāsa* and, using *navya* style, to
231 refute the Dvaita point of view re-establishing the true message of Advaita. For
232 initiation he went to the senior authority among the *saṃnyāsins*, Viśveśvara
233 Sarasvatī, who asked MS to come back once he had written a new commentary on
234 BG. A year later the commentary was ready. Overwhelmed by its deepness,
235 Viśveśvara Sarasvatī conferred the *saṃnyāsadīkṣā* to Kamalanayana, who became
236 Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. It is also believed that MS spent the last period of his life at
237 Haridvāra, where he passed away.

238 II.1.1 MS's Textual Production

239 Along with widely discussed problems of dating MS, the question related to the
240 authorship of all the works attributed to him is still open. Aufrecht's *Catalogus*
241 *Catalogorum* (I, 2001, pp. 426–427) mentions 22 works under the name
242 Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.¹⁷ Among these texts Divanji (1933, pp. II–III) individuates
243 some repetitions,¹⁸ reducing the number to 18. Out of these, as he elaborately
244 shows, we can consider only 10 *granthas* genuine. It is possible to divide these
245 works in two main groups: independent treatises (*prakaraṇa*) and commentaries
246 (*bhāṣya/tīkā/vyākhyā*). Among them there are some works with a marked Advaitic
247 tendency, and others that are absolutely devotional, while still others present both
248 aspects.

249 Among the commentaries we find: 1. *Samkṣepaśārīrakasārasaṃgraha* (hereafter
250 SSSS), a commentary on the *Samkṣepaśārīraka* of Sarvajñātman (hereafter SS);¹⁹ 2.
251 *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* (hereafter GAD), a running commentary on BG; 3. *Siddhānta-*
252 *bindu* (hereafter SB), an interesting compendium of Vedāntic topics based on the
253 *Daśaśloki* of Śaṅkarācārya;²⁰ 4. *Mahimnastotraṭīkā* (hereafter MST) on

¹⁶ Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa was the son of Rāmeśvara Bhaṭṭa, and, according to some accounts, the *guru* of Mādhava Sarasvatī. See fn. 71.

¹⁷ See also the XVIII volume of the *New Catalogus Catalogorum* compiled by Dash (2007, pp. 148–151) and the bibliography (1995, pp. 583–585) of the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy* edited by K. Potter. I will not discuss works just attributed to MS or others surely not his own (such as *Ānandamandākinī*, *Vedastuti*, *Ānandabodhaṭīkā*, *Aṣṭavikṛtivarāṇa*, *Śāṇḍilyasūtraṭīkā*, *Rājñāṃpratibodha*, and *Kṛṣṇakutūhalanāṭaka*).

¹⁸ For example, Aufrecht considers the *Prasthānabheda* an independent text.

¹⁹ Even though this gloss is not mentioned in other works by MS, based on its *maṅgala* verses and the colophons it appears to be genuinely written by MS (Gupta 2006, p. 8). Divanji (1933, p. VI) adds that in ARR (1917, p. 45) MS hints to his own other work while dealing with the removal of two of the four kinds of impossibility (*asaṃbhāvanā*), which represent the impediments to attaining liberation. This same issue is treated in very similar terms in the beginning of the III chapter (*ad* SŚ III.1, 2005, pp. 256–257) and in a portion of the commentary of chapter IV (*ad* SŚ IV; 2005, pp. 642–643) of SSSS. It might be suggested that, due to the style and the extreme clarity coupled with a strict adherence to the commented texts, this gloss is the first work of MS.

²⁰ SB is openly referred to five times in AS: four in the first *pariccheda* and one in the fourth (Divanji 1933, p. IV).



Puṣpadanta's *Śivamahimnastotra*;²¹ 5. *Harilīlavyākhyā* (hereafter HLV) a commentary on Vopadeva's (mid-XIII-CE) *Harilīlāmṛta*;²² 6. *Bhāgavatapṛathamaśloka-vyākhyā* or *Paramaḥaṃsapriya*, a short commentary on the first verse of *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*.²³

On the side of the independent treatises, the following texts are listed: 7. AS; 8. *Bhagavadbhaktirasāyana* (hereafter BBR);²⁴ 9. *Vedāntakāpalatīkā* (hereafter VKL);²⁵ and 10. *Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa* (hereafter ARR), a reply to Śaṅkara Mīśra's (XV cen. CE; 1442–1542, Saha 2011, p. 14) *Bhedaratna* (hereafter BR), which in turn was a reply to Śrīharṣa's KKK, mainly directed to the eighth section of the first *pariccheda* called *Caturvidhabhedakhaṇḍana* of the KKK (Yogīndrānanda 1992, pp. 96–121). This probably represents the last genuine work written by MS, since it mentions his other works but is not referred to in them (Modi 1985, p. 54).²⁶

As previously stated, according to tradition, in order to initiate the young MS into *saṃnyāsa*, Viśveśvara Sarasvatī demanded a commentary on BG (Saha 2011, p. 25). Hence, GAD is believed to be the first work of MS. However, even though its style is very clear and with minor uses of *navya* methodology, we find in it some references to AS, BBR, and SB, which make it impossible to consider it his first work.²⁷

II.1.2 MS between Advaita and Bhakti

From the glorious *vaiṣṇava* movement of Bengal MS inherited his devotion to Kṛṣṇa as it is depicted in the BP. MS, in fact, occupies an important position among the

²¹ Despite the fact that this *stotra* is evidently devoted to extolling Śiva, the commentator turns the verses to concern both Viṣṇu and Śiva. In addition, in the opening verses as well as in the colophon he mentions his *guru* Viśveśvara; the *Vedāntakāpalatīkā* is also referred herein as the author's own work (*ad Mahimnastotra* 26–27). Divanji (1933, p. VIII) affirms that in the commentary on verse 27 the author writing *anyatroktam asti tat sarvam...* hints at the closing section on the VIII verse of *Daśaśloki* in SB. The *Prasthānabheda*, sometimes edited separately, is nothing but MS's commentary on the VII verse of the *Mahimnastotra*. Hanneder confirms both the genuine attribution to MS of this gloss and that the *Prasthānabheda* is an extract of the *Mahimnastotraṭīkā* (1999, pp. 576–577).

²² According to Modi (1985, p. 37) this is a work of MS, while for Abhyankar Sastri (SB 1986, p. 27), its author, is a different Madhusūdana; but there are no evidences for either of these views. However, Gupta (2006, p. 9) concludes that, due to the certain similarities in style and argumentations, this could be MS's work.

²³ Transmitted without a colophon, this short work mentions the *Bhagavadbhaktirasāyana* (Divanji 1933, p. VIII). Therefore many scholars accept it as a work of MS.

²⁴ This is perhaps the most important devotional work of MS in three *ullāsas*, in which he treats the essence of devotion, the condition through which the mind becomes eligible for devotion, its various stages (*bhūmikā*), and the emotions (*bhāva*) produced by merging in those stages. In it MS, building on *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*'s teachings, describes *bhakti* as an independent spiritual path capable of leading to the supreme goal. MS mentions VKL (1998, p. 54) at I.19 and SB at I.24 (1998, p. 57). GAD (XVIII.66) refers to BBR for a deeper examination of the topic at hand.

²⁵ VKL is referred to six times in the AS (Divanji 1933, p. IV).

²⁶ By contrast, at the beginning of his introduction Modi (1985) says that the last works of MS are AS and GAD.

²⁷ In GAD *ad* BG II.16, II.18 and V.16 one can find a direct reference to AS; SB is mentioned in GAD *ad* BG II.18. *Bhagavadbhaktirasāyana* (BBR) is referred to in GAD *ad* BG VII.16, XVIII.65–66.



275 *vaiṣṇavas* of his time (Ananta Śāstrī Phaḍke 1961, p. 8). This is witnessed by the
276 four markedly devotional works attributed to him: BBR, *Harilīlāvyaḥkhyā*, MŚT, and
277 *Paramahaṃsapriya*.²⁸ His love for Kṛṣṇa and his faith in Advaita made him a
278 successor of the Advaita theological hermeneutics represented by the commentaries
279 on the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* written by Vopadeva and Śrīdhara (XIII CE). These two
280 authors represented a tendency in which non-dualism and *bhakti* found a common
281 ground and, in some way, harmoniously merged into one. Vopadeva and Śrīdhara
282 harmonized the Upaniṣadic concept of an immutable, unqualified, formless,
283 ineffable *brahman* to the infinitely charming personality of a godhead.

284 Hence, it could be also maintained that in AS and in other writings, MS
285 transformed Advaita itself. He allowed a scope for *bhakti* as a path independent, or
286 rather complementary, to Vedic and Vedāntic prescriptions, in such a way that the
287 philosophical implications for Advaita have still not been fully assessed. Modi
288 (1985: 12-13) argues that:

289 In spite of being a follower of Śaṅkara's monism, he was an ardent devotee of
290 Śrī Kṛṣṇa. To Madhusūdana, this was neither self-contradictory nor surprising
291 [...] Just as in the days of Kumārila and Śaṅkara the most important problem
292 was the reconciliation of *karma* and *jñāna*, so in the days of Madhusūdana and
293 Vallabha the greatest problem was that of *jñāna* and *bhakti*.²⁹ [...] but it was
294 left for Madhusūdana to solve it thoroughly.

295 Besides, in several places he openly, even if respectfully, disagreed with
296 Śaṅkarācārya himself (Minkowski 2011, p. 222).³⁰

297 II.2 Some Instances of Internal Evidences for Establishing a Relative 298 Chronology of MS's Works

299 Sanjukta Gupta courageously attempted an internal chronology of the works of MS
300 (2006, pp. 10–11). I personally believe we should wait for a further historical as
301 well as philological examination of them, since the elements we possess right now
302 are not at all conclusive. What I could plausibly say is just that among the ten works
303 by MS considered genuine, it seems that the first written was SŚSS and the last
304 ARR. I could also push myself to affirm that VKL and SB, which mention each
305 other, might have been composed at around the same time. In addition, GAD and

²⁸ Among the devotional works attributed to MS there is also *Īśvarapratipattiprakāśa*, brought to light in 1921 by M. M. Gaṇapati Śāstrī at Trivandrum. According to Divanji (1933, p. XII) and Modi (1985, p. 46) it is a genuine work because it summarily covers almost all the issues touched by SB. However, since it is quite usual for Advaita textbooks to cover these issues, and since there are no direct references to MS's other works, its authorship remains an open issue.

²⁹ Together with the explicit devotionally directed works, it should be mentioned that MS tries, mainly in GAD XVIII.54 and XVIII.56–66, to harmonise *bhakti*, *yoga* and *jñāna*.

³⁰ Most famous instances of this reverential disagreement are in AS *Āgamabādhoddhāra* (AS 1997, pp. 435–436) as regards Śaṅkara's interpretation of *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* (hereafter BSBh) II.2.28–29, where according to MS the aphorism does not refute Vijñānavādins, as claimed by Śaṅkara, but Sūnyavādins (Modi 1985, p. 7). MS differs from Śaṅkara also in GAD where the views of the *ācārya* are not in harmony with the *bhaktimārga* of the *Gītā* (Modi app. iii), so he interprets it in a new light, especially as for the comments *ad* II.29, II.39, VI.14 and XVIII.66.



ARR mention AS, thus, they must be later, and HLV does not refer to any other work of MS. AS mentions also VKL and SB. In fact, these three texts treat almost analogous topics. To sum up, after SSSS come SB, VKL and only at a more mature stage AS, where SB, VKL and GAD are mentioned. The MST mentions only VKL, while dealing with the means of knowledge for establishing *brahman* (ad MS 26, 1996, p. 103) and with the arousal of the undetermined knowledge of the word (ad MS 27, 1996, p. 107); BBR refers to VKL (1998, p. 54) while presenting the nature of the mind, and later on to SB (1998, p. 58). The BPPP refers to BBR concerning *bhaktirasa*.³¹ In any case it is interesting to note that in nearly all of his texts MS refers very much to his other works. By some extent, this tendency is quite remarkable, because it gives us an idea of the personality of MS and of his self-confidence concerning his works (Devī 1988, pp. 9–12). It could also be maintained that for attempting an internal chronology among MS's works we can look at them from a diachronic perspective as well as from a synchronic one. It might be, in fact, that MS composed part of a text and periodically abandoned it for some time while working on other texts and later went back to it. On one side this could explain the many cross-references of MS within his own works, and on the other the difficulty to determine with certitude a relative chronology.

Here, I shall limit my investigation to a small number of the more relevant instances of cross-references in SB, VKL, AS, GAD, BBR, and ARR (I will mention SSSS just *en passant*). The comparison of the *maṅgala* verses offers interesting data (the different writing style in the table shows the different versions of the same concept.):

AS (1997: 8)	śrīrāmaviśveśvaramādhavānām aikyena sākṣātkṛtamādhavānām/ sparśena nirdhūtatamorajobhyaḥ pādotthitebhyo 'stu namo rajobhyaḥ// 2 //
GAD (2005: 744)	śrīrāmaviśveśvaramādhavānām prasādam āsādyā mayā gurūṇām/ vyākhyānam etad vihitam subodham samarpitam taccaraṇāmbujeṣu// 5 //
SB (SB/S, 1933: 1)	śrīśaṃkarācāryānavāvatāraṃ viśveśvaraṃ viśvagurum praṇamya/ vedāntaśāstraśravaṇālasānām bodhāya kurve kam api prabandham// 1 //
VKL (1962: 1)	durāpaḥ śāstrārtho niyatayatamānair api budhair na saṃprāptum śakyo malinamatinā yady api mayā/ tathāpi śrīviśveśvaracaraṇapaṅkeruhasudhā- sudhārābhiḥ sikto na katham api rikto 'smi bhavitā// 2 //

³¹ In this contribution I limit myself to presenting some textual instances of internal cross-references in MS's works, so I shall not examine all their colophons (*puṣpikā*) except for VKL.



- 336
337 **MST** (1996: 1) **viśveśvaram** guruṃ natvā mahimākhyastuter ayam/
pūrvācāryakṛtavyākhyāsaṃgrahaḥ kriyate mayā// 1 //
- 338 **ARR** (1917: 46) advaitaratnam etat tu **śrīviśveśvarapādayoḥ**/
samarpitam athaitena prīyatām sa dayānidhiḥ//
- 339 **SSSS** (I, 2002: 2) **śrīrāmaviśveśvaramādhavānām** praṇamya
pādāmbujapuṇyapāmsūn/
teṣāṃ prabhāvād aham asmi yogaḥ śilāpi caitanyam
alabdhayebhyaḥ// 2 //

341 GAD's instance (2005, p. 744) is an example of the content of these benedictory
342 verses: "Having obtained the grace of my teachers Śrīrāma, Viśveśvara and
343 Mādhava, I compose this easy explanation, offered at their lotus feet." In all the
344 instances presented MS extols his teachers (Viśveśvara, Śrīrāma and Mādhava) with
345 *maṅgala* stanzas placed either at the beginning or at the end (for GAD and ARR) of
346 his texts. These repeated and standardized references to his masters in the *maṅgala*
347 verses help us to reconstruct MS's life and to differentiate between the authentic
348 works and the spurious ones.

349 II.2.1 AS

350 The AS is certainly the pivotal point among all the works of MS, not only as a
351 landmark for the internal coherence of the author himself, but also for the later
352 generation of Advaitins. As a matter of fact, for the Advaitins post-MS, following
353 the AS becomes a must, a stamp of orthodoxy and adherence to tradition, as well as
354 a sign of great doctrinal skill. In other words, Advaitins after MS could not help
355 being "madhusūdanian". In addition, MS writes the AS to turn around the stagnant
356 dialectical *vis* of Advaita, defending, rewriting and correcting old positions. Nearly
357 all the positions of MS are present in the AS; all the issues treated in the other works
358 are here present in a very elaborated and enlarged way.³²

359 II.2.2 GAD

360 This running gloss to BG³³ is an extremely interesting text, free from all the
361 technicalities of AS, SB, VKL, and ARR, but extremely useful for comprehending

³² As for its relative chronology, AS is referred to in GAD *ad* BG II.16 (2005, pp. 79–80), while dealing with the difference between real (*sat*) and unreal (*asat*); GAD *ad* BG II.18 (2005, pp. 93–94), explaining the difference between direct and indirect cognition; GAD *ad* BG V.16 (2005, p. 276) dealing with the nature of the unreal. ARR refers to AS in dealing with hearing (*śravaṇa*, 1917, p. 9); with the nature of the unreal (1917, p. 26); with reflecting (*manana*) and meditating (*nididhyāsana*) in two passages (1917, pp. 24, 37). On the other hand, AS refers to SB in differentiating the empirical degree of reality from the absolute one (1997, p. 536); while diversifying direct and indirect cognition (1997, p. 579), discussing *dṛṣṭiṣṭivāda* (1997, p. 537) and *manana* and *nididhyāsana* (1997, p. 559). AS mentions also VKL on *śravaṇa* (1997, pp. 524, 866), *manana* and *nididhyāsana* (1997, p. 519) as well as *abhihitānvayavāda* (1997, p. 705).

³³ The version of the BG used by MS for his commentary differs in some verses from the *vulgata*. Cf. I.8, I.46, VI.9, VIII.16, IX.21, XI.8, XI.17, XI.28, XI.37, XI.41, XIII.20, XIV.23, XIV.25 and XV.5 (Saha 2011, p. 370).



the XVI century understanding of the BG. Apart from being a real treasure chest of quotations and new readings of several Advaitin and non-Advaitin texts, it directly refers to many of MS's works.

For example, in GAD *ad* BG VII.16 (*caturvidhā bhajante mām janāḥ sukr̥tino 'rjuna / āto jijñāsur arthārthī jñānī ca bharatarṣabha /*), where the words in the BG verse recall a devotional context, BBR is mentioned just as an internal annotation of MS, maybe for his readers, which indicates that the subject *bhakti*, with its subdivisions and its means, is analysed specifically in BBR.³⁴ More interesting are the references to BBR in GAD *ad* BG XVIII.65 and 66. GAD (XVIII) quotes two verses from *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* (VII.5.23–24), also cited in BBR (1997, p. 108). Immediately thereafter, MS refers to BBR saying *etac ca bhaktirasāyane vyākhyātaṃ vistāreṇa* “and this has been explained at length in *Bhaktirasāyana*.” However, in BBR, the topic concerned is the hearing of the qualities of Viṣṇu (*hariguṇaśruti*, BBR 1997, p. 106), which constitutes the fourth level of devotion (*bhaktibhūmikā*).³⁵ In the passage there is no original explanation, but rather a sequence of verses from *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*, which are cited directly as they are. What is interesting is that there also MS cites BG XVIII.65 (BBR 1997, p. 113). Therefore, we have a cross reference in the two texts.

Moreover, the next verse (BG XVIII.66)³⁶ is possibly another instance of the use of BBR material in GAD. The context is the definition of *bhakti* and the means for it, and the two texts are quite similar in referring to the subject:

GAD *ad* BG XVIII.66 (2005, p. 734)
niścayena paramānandaghanamūrtim
anantaṃ śrīvāsudevam eva bhagavantam
anukṣaṇabhāvanayā bhajasva, idam eva
paramaṃ tattvaṃ nāto 'dhikam astīti
vicārapūrvakena premaprakarṣeṇa
sarvānātmacintāśūnyatayā manovṛtṭyā
tailadhārāvad avicchinnayā satataṃ
cintayety arthaḥ.

BBR I.1 (1998, p. 5)
tataś cādrutacittasya nirvedapūrvakaṃ
tattvajñānaṃ, drutacittasya tu
bhagavatkaṭhāśravaṇādibhāgavata-
dharmaśraddhāpūrvikā bhaktir ity
avadhitvena dvayam apy upātṭam. tato
'ntaḥkaraṇaśuddhyāśṭāṅgayogam
anuṣṭhāya tailadhārāvad
avicchinnabhagavadekākārapratyaya-
paramparātmakaikāgratāyogyam
manas sampādayet.

³⁴ GAD (2005, p. 393): *bhagavadanuraktirūpāyās tu bhakteḥ svarūpaṃ sādhanam bhedās tathā bhaktānām api bhagavadbhaktirasāyane 'smābhiḥ saviṣeṣaṃ prapañcitā iṭihoparamyate* “I especially elaborated on the nature, the means and the subdivisions of devotion, whose form is love for the Lord, as well as [the nature, the means and the subdivisions] of the devotees in the *Bhagavadbhaktirasāyana*, so here I stop.”

³⁵ There is also a terminological correspondence between BBR (1997, p. 115) and GAD (2005, p. 733). Both texts call the means to supreme *bhakti* the performance of duties related to the Lord (*bhāgavatadharmānuṣṭhāna*).

³⁶ In the commentary of this verse MS disagrees with Śaṅkara in interpreting the word *-dharmān*. According to MS it means all kinds of social duties etc. (GAD *ad* BG XVIII.66, 2005, p. 734, *kecid varṇadharmāḥ kecid āśramadharmāḥ kecid sāmānyadharmā ity evaṃ sarvān api dharmān parityajya, vidyamānān avidyamānān vā śaraṇatvenānādr̥tya*), while for Śaṅkara it stands for *karman*: *sarvad-harmān parityajya saṃnyāsa sarvakarmāṇi iti etat* (BG1, III, 2000, p. 400).



In both texts MS refers to *bhakti* using a very similar terminology, but this is due to an already commonly accepted definition, which drives us back to Rāmānuja's definition of *bhaktiyoga* as a condition of devotional contemplation (*dhyāna/upāsana*).³⁷ Both instances compare devotion with a flux of oil (*tailadhārā*)³⁸ and treat it as a series (*paramparā*) of uninterrupted (*avicchinna*) mental modifications (*manovṛtti*) with the Lord alone as content (*bhagavadekākāra*). This mental condition has some analogous requirements for both texts: in GAD a constant reflection (*vicāra*), an extreme degree of love (*premaprakarṣa*) and a mind free from all sensual objects (*sarvānātmacintāsūnya*); similarly, BBR presupposes a mental purity (*antaḥkaraṇasuddhi*) and the practice of the *aṣṭāṅgayoga*.

Modi (1985, p. 49, n. 41) noted that GAD *ad* BG II.13, II.15 and II.28 relies almost *verbatim* on SB without directly acknowledging it. To these unacknowledged references I would personally also add GAD *ad* BG II.17. Let us now consider two of them in detail.

BG II.13 regards a comparison of the several changes occurring within a single life, with the *jīvātman* who jumps from one bodily existence to another one. On the other side, the corresponding SB passage lies just at the beginning of the analysis of the meaning of the term *tvam* in the *mahāvākya* "Thou are That!" (*tat tvam asi, Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI.8.7 ff.), where *tvam* is nothing but the individual self. Both texts present a few divergent opinions (*vipratipatti*) regarding the *ātman*'s nature:³⁹

GAD *ad* BG II.13 (2005, pp. 63–64)

etena yad āhur **dehamātram ātmeti**
cārvākāḥ, indriyāṇi manaḥ prāṇas ceti
tad ekadeśinaḥ, kṣaṇikaṃ vijñānam iti
saugatāḥ, dehātiriktaḥ sthīro
dehaparimāṇa iti digambarāḥ.

SB I (SB/S, 1933, p. 5; SB/NR/LV, 1989, pp. 106–113)

tatra **dehākārapariṇatāni catvāri**
bhūtāny eva tvampadārtha iti
cārvākāḥ. cakṣurādīni pratyekam
ity apare. militānīty anye. mana ity
eke. prāṇa ity anye. kṣaṇikaṃ
vijñānam iti saugatāḥ. sūnyam iti
mādhyamikāḥ. dehendriyātirikto
dehaparimāṇa iti digambarāḥ.

Here the close similarity between the two parts is clear. In both passages MS opens with Cārvākas, then Buddhists (*saugata*) and Jains (*digambara*). In SB he specifies that according to the majority of Cārvākas "the meaning of the term *tvam*" (*tvampadārtha*) is nothing but the four gross elements (*bhūta*) transformed into physical shape (*dehākārapariṇatāni*). Then he lists some divergent minor opinions

³⁷ Rāmānuja, in his *Śrībhāṣya* (I.1.1, 1989, pp. 55–56; see also IV.1.1), defines *dhyāna* as *dhyānam ca tailadhārāvad avicchinnaśmṛtisantānarūpam*, "and contemplation is of the nature of a sequence of uninterrupted awareness, like a flow of oil". A similar instance is in Rāmānuja's commentary on BG IX.34, precisely while he glosses on the first half-line *manmanā bhava: sarvasvāmini tailadhārāvad avicchedena niviṣṭamanā bhava* "be with your mind like a flow of oil uninterruptedly immersed in the Lord of everything" (BG1, II, 2000, p. 196).

³⁸ The quality of oil is greasiness (*sneha*), which also means "affection" or "love".

³⁹ This nearly resembles, in a matter of language and order, the opening part of VKL where MS lists the different views about liberation (1962, pp. 3–13). For an instance of this subject see the last part of the Sect. II.2.3 concerning VKL.



among them (*ekadeśin*): according to some philosophers the term *tvam* indicates respectively the faculties (*indriya*) or the breaths (*prāṇa*) or the mind (*manas*) individually taken (*pratyeke*); for others they should be understood jointly (*milita*). The slight difference between GAD and SB lies in the fact that while GAD refers to the divergences at a stretch SB is a bit more analytic. The short sentences concerning Buddhists and Jains are almost identical. Nonetheless, MS does not mention the other text in which he deals with the same issues, because this is a typical presentation of Advaita texts. Thus, in this case there is no real need for a clear citation or reference because every Advaitin is aware of the *locus classicus* for this introduction, meaning the Advaita's mine⁴⁰ of knowledge par excellence: BSBh (I.1.1).

Another instance of textual re-use from GAD, not recognized by Modi, is *ad* BG II.17 and concerns the condition of deep sleep. The passages are mutually connected but the way of referring to each other is not immediately clear:

GAD *ad* BG II.17 (2005, p. 82)

suṣuptāv ahaṃkārahāve 'pi tadvā-
sanāvāsītājñānabhāsakasya caitanyasya
svataḥ sphuraṇāt. **anyathāitāvantam**
kālam ahaṃ kim api nājñāsiṣam iti
suṣuptotthitasya smaraṇam na syāt. na
cotthitasya jñānābhāvānumitir iyam iti
vācyaṃ, **suṣuptikālarūpapakṣājñānāl**
līṅgāsambhavāc ca. asmaraṇāder
vyabhicāritvāt smaraṇājanaka-
nirvikalpādyabhāvāsādhakatvāc ca.
jñānasāmagryabhāvāsyā
cānyonyāśrayagrastatvāt.

SB VIII (SB/S 1933, pp. 69–70; SB/
NR/LV 1989, pp. 420–426; SB 1986,
pp. 121–125)

iha ca sukham aham asvāpsam na
kiṃcid avedīṣam iti suptotthitasya
parāmarśāt, ananubhave ca
parāmarśānupapatteḥ.
antaḥkaraṇoparāgākālīnānu-
bhavajanyatvābhāvāc ca na
tattollekhābhāve 'pi **smaraṇatvānu-**
papattiḥ. smaraṇe
tattollekhaniyamābhāvāc ca
jāgraddaśāyām asvāpsam ity
anubhavānupapatteḥ līṅgābhāvena ca
āśrayāsiddhyā cānumānasyāsaṃ-
bhavāt. ahaṃkāras tu utthānasamaya
evānubhūyate. suṣuptau līnatvena
tasyānanubhūtatvāt smaraṇānupapatteḥ
[...] tatrāntaḥkaraṇavṛttijanakasāmagrī-
sambhave 'pi pramātvābhāvāvarodhe-
nāntaḥkaraṇasyāśamarthyāt.

In both passages MS refers to the recollection (*parāmarśa*/*smaraṇa*) arising in the awakened person (*suptotthita*) after deep sleep (*suṣupti*): in GAD “During that

⁴⁰ In SB VIII (SB/S 1933, p. 61), MS most probably refers to BSBh calling it the “mine” (*ākara*): *yathā caitat tathā vyaktam ākare*.



much time I did not know anything” (*etāvantam kālam aham kim api nājñāśiṣam*) and in SB “I slept well, I did not know anything” (*sukham aham asvāpsam na kiṃcid avedīṣam*). These sections from both texts, in addition, point out the impossibility of understanding this recollection as an inference (*anumānasyāsaṃbhavāt*) because the *probans* (*hetu*) of this hypothetical inference would necessarily be flawed. The two texts just differ on the nature of the *pseudo-probans* (*hetvābhāsa*): a deviating (*vyabhicārin*) one for GAD and the non-establishment of the inferential locus/subject (*āśrayāsiddhi*) for SB.

In the GAD passage the core of the analysis aims at establishing the auto-luminosity (*svaprakāśatva*) of the self, which persists also during deep sleep. SB is more focused on proving the nature of recollection of the cognition arising after awakening. In deep sleep, while the ego has merged into its cause (i.e. ignorance), the consciousness illuminates that ignorance consisting of ego impressions. If this were not accepted, it would be impossible to explain the recollection of the just awakened person: “I slept well, I did not know anything” (see below, Sect. 3.2.3).

II.2.3 VKL: Quotations as Evidence about Missing Portions

Karmarkar’s edition of VKL (1962) is based on two manuscripts, the first from the British Library’s former India Office (IO) and the second from the Ānandāśrama (Ā) Library in Poona, as well as on the only other printed edition, edited at Benares in 1920 by Ganganath Jha and Gopinath Kaviraj. The two manuscripts end respectively with these colophons: IO) *iti vedāntakalpalatikāyām paramaḥaṃsa-parivrajakamadhusūdanasarasvatīkṛtāyām sasāadhanāpavarganirūpaṇam nāma prathamastabakaḥ*; Ā) *iti śrīparamaḥaṃsaśrīviśveśvarasarasvatīśiṣyaśrīmadhusūdanasarasvatyuktavedāntakalpalatikāyām sasāadhanāpavarganirūpaṇaḥ prathamastabakaḥ saṃpūrṇaḥ* (Karmarkar 1962, pp. ix–xi). As easily visible, both the colophons refer to the extant VKL as the first (*prathama*) *stabaka* ‘chapter’, named “Description of the realization together with the means [for attaining it]” (*sasāadhanāpavarganirūpaṇa*), of the entire VKL. Until now, unfortunately, no other manuscript of VKL has been found (Panicker 1995, pp. 116–117). More precisely, there is more evidence for the assumption that there might be some additional *stabakas* in VKL. For instance, VKL has been referred to twice in SB. The first reference is in the commentary on the eighth stanza of *Daśaśloki* (SB/S 1933, p. 70; SB/NR/LV 1989, pp. 431–432; SB 1986, p. 133). The reference is at the end of an elaborate discussion concerning the condition of deep sleep (*susuptya-vasthā*). Once the *jīvātman* penetrates deep sleep the internal organ (*antaḥkāraṇa*) is also absorbed in its cause (*kāraṇa*), namely *avidyā*, and steps back remaining only as a latent impression (*vāsanā*). On getting back to the waking condition, the individual has a kind of recollection (*parāmarśa*): “I pleasantly slept, I did not know anything!” (*sukham aham asvāpsam na kiṃcid avedīṣam*). This kind of cognition presupposes an earlier direct experience of pleasure (*sukha*) and ignorance (*ajñāna*). If the internal organ is absent during deep sleep, then to whom can these experiences be attributed to? Without an experience there cannot be such a subsequent recollection. To this MS answers by distinguishing three kinds of functional modes



(*vṛtti*) of ignorance: one in the form of the witness (*sākṣyākāra*) of that experience, one in the form of pleasure (*sukhākāra*) and another in the form of a particular state of ignorance limited to that precise situation (*avasthājñāna*).⁴¹

Here we find a peculiar reading of MS. He says that in deep sleep there is no *antaḥkaraṇa*, no ego at all, so it cannot be experienced. A recollection of the self as superimposed on the ego takes place, but this is only due to *avidyā*. Recollection, like doubt and perceptual errors, is dependent on the witness, thus it cannot be intended as right knowledge, which is grasped by the function of some means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*); but it is also not a totally false cognition. Thus MS does not understand it to be a kind of knowledge, but simply as a mental activity (*mānasī kriyā*). By the way, in establishing this, MS refers to a passage from Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya* (I.1.4):

BSBh (BSBh/VK/KP 2000: 129; BSBh/B/ RP/NN 2000: 83)

SB (SB/S 1933, p 70; SB/NR/LV 1989, pp. 426–427; SB 1986, p. 127)

yathā ca ‘puruṣo vāva gautamāgniḥ’ (ChU V.7.1), ‘yoṣā vāva gautamāgniḥ’ (ChU V.8.1) ity atra yoṣitpuruṣayor agnibuddhir **mānasī kriyā** kevala**codanājanyatvāt** kriyaiva sā puruṣatantrā ca.

ata eva **codanājanyatvān mānasī kriyā** sā, na jñānam.

MS then completes his explanation by jumping to a different issue. Just as the recollection is a mental function (*manovṛtti*) different (*vilakṣaṇa*) from perceptual error (*bhrama*) and right knowledge (*pramā*), the hypothetical argumentation (*tarka*) is a kind of mental function which, being dependent on desire (*icchādhīna*), is different from perceptual error and right knowledge. This particular understanding of *tarka* plays a role in the analysis of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* ([hereafter BṛU] VI.4.5): *ātmā vā re [...] śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*. This Upaniṣadic sentence is an injunction (*vidhi*), which in the process of reflecting the real purport of Vedānta sentences (*vedāntavicāra*) prescribes as primary (*pradhāna/mukhya*) towards realization (*darśana*) the hearing (*śravaṇa*) of the teaching about the self. Conversely, reflection (*manana*) and meditation (*nididhyāsana*) are auxiliaries (*sahakārin/ārādupakāraka*). This kind of *vedāntavicāra* has the shape of a fourfold *tarka*,⁴² the explanation of which, according to MS, is distributed within the four

⁴¹ MS has two different views of *sākṣin*, one metaphysical and one epistemological. For this division see Gupta (2006, pp. 92–93).

⁴² MS mentions these four types of *tarkas*, and adds a fifth one, which are nothing but five forms of positive (*anvaya*) and negative (*vyatireka*) agreements: (1) *dr̥gdr̥śyānavayavyatireka*; (2) *sākṣisākṣyānavayavyatireka*; (3) *āgamāpāyitadavadhyanvayavyatireka*; (4) *duḥkhaparamapremāspadānavayavyatireka*; 5) *anuvṛttavyāvṛttānavayavyatireka*.



adhyāyas of the BSBh. At this point MS refers to VKL: *vistāras tu vedāntakalpalatikāyām anusandheyah* “By contrast, an elaborate [explanation] should be searched in the *Vedāntakalpalatikā*.”

What is interesting for our purpose is that in the VKL, apart from an elusive mention to these *tarkas*, I could not find any elaborate discussion on these topics (Divanji 1933, pp. 193–194 notes).

Let us now look at this issue through the words of both texts where, even without *verbatim* citation, there is nonetheless clear mutual reference:⁴³

VKL (1962, pp. 172–173)

tato 'dviṭiyabrahmaikyaviṣa-
yavedāntaśaktitātparyaniścayaphalake-
na **śravaṇākhyatarkaṇa**
kriyārthatvādibhir hetvābhāsair vā
advitīyabrahmātmaikye vedāntānām
prāmāṇyāsambhavarūpaś cittadoṣaḥ.
evaṃ vedāntānām
prāmāṇyāsambhāvanāpracaya-
hetu-
bhūtacittaiḥkāgryapratibandhakaś
cittadoṣaḥ
prameyasambhāvanāphalakena
mananākhyena tarkaṇa. tato
'nyānuparaktabrahmātmaikya-
viṣayasamśkārapracayena
hetujñānavṛttiphalakena **prayatnena**
nididhyāsanākhyena, anādi-
pravṛttidehātmañājan-
itasamśkārapracayaḥ cittadoṣo
'pasāryate.

SB (SB/S 1933, pp. 70; SB/NR/LV 1989, pp. 427–432; SB 1986, pp. 127–133)
vyāpyaropeṇa
vyāpakaprasaṅganātmakasya tasya
icchādhīnatayā
bhramapramāvilakṣaṇatvāt. ata eva
manananididhyāsanasaḥite **śravaṇākhye**
vedāntavicāre '**śrotavyo mantavyo**
nididhyāsitavya' ityādividhir
upapadyate, tasya **caturvidhānvayavya-**
tirekāditarkarūpatvāt.
dr̥gdṛśyānvayavyatirekaḥ,
sākṣisākṣyānvayavyatirekaḥ,
āgamāpāyitadavadhyanvaya-
vyatirekaḥ, **duḥkhaparama-**
premāspadānvayavyatireka iti.
anuvṛttavyāvṛttānvayavyatirekaḥ
pañcamah. etac ca sarveṣāṃ
vedāntānukūlatarkāṇām
caturlakṣaṇīmīmāṃsāpratipāditānām
upalakṣaṇam ity abhiyuktāḥ.

In both texts the main referent is a particular meaning of hypothetical argumentation or reasoning (*tarka*), again intended as a mental operation. But while in VKL hearing (*śravaṇa*) and reflection (*manana*) are called *tarkas*, SB lists the five *tarkas* mentioned in the table. Here we see that in VKL there is a reference to *tarkas* as a means to attaining the non-dual, liberating knowledge, but they are nothing but hearing (*śravaṇa*), reflection (*manana*) and meditation (*nididhyāsana*).

⁴³ The two texts quote or refer to each other many times. SB (Sarasvati 1986, p. 133) refers to *śravaṇa* mentioning VKL; it differentiates between the *vyāvahārika* and *pāramārthika* level of reality referring to VKL (SB, 1986, p. 151). VKL (1962, pp. 163–164) mentions SB on presenting the process of manifestation (*sṛṣṭikrama*).



So there is not a correspondence with the very technical meaning touched on in SB, where MS informed the reader that VKL should treat the topic at length.

Another similar instance concerning again VKL and SB (SB/S 1933: 76; SB/NR/LV 1989: 442; SB 1986, p. 141) is placed right at the end of the commentary of the eighth stanza of *Daśaśloka*. Here MS, having already described the three conditions (*avasthātraya*) through which the *jīvātman* and the three principles identified (*abhimānin*) with those same conditions pass in a microcosmic sphere, shifts to a macrocosmic sphere. In doing so, he follows BSBh (I.3.13) and establishes a link between individual (*adhyātma*), elemental (*adhibhūta*) and divine (*adhidaiva*) levels, which correspond to each letter of the monosyllable *om*, namely *a*, *u* and *m*. A meditative practice (*upāsana*) aiming at the unifying vision of all these principles leads to the world of Hiraṇyagarbha (*hiraṇyagarbhalokaprāpti*) and the subsequent gradual liberation (*kramamukti*). In contrast, direct liberation (*sākṣāt-mokṣa*) is the knowledge of the underlying reality, the witness consciousness (*sākṣicaitanya*) of all these principles, free from all limitations. Since the three conditions, together with the three principles identified with them, are products of ignorance (*avidyātmakatvāt*), they are ultimately false (*mithyā*), while the witness alone shines as the fourth (*turīya*). In closing this section, MS again refers to a more detailed and developed argumentation within VKL: *vistareṇa caitat prapañcitam asmābhir vedāntakalpalatikāyām ity uparamyate* “And this very [issue] has been elaborately developed by us in *Vedāntakalpalatikā*. So I stop [here].”

I agree with Divanji (1933, 201 notes) when he affirms that in VKL there is nowhere a similar discussion regarding the three conditions of the *jīvātman*. The only mention in VKL (1962, p. 98) of dream phenomena (*svapna*) is inserted in a completely different analysis. Therefore, it should be rather likely that at least one or more *stabakas* can still be found.

As a last remark in this section I would like to shift the attention to a common issue of VKL (1962, pp. 3–13) and SŚSS (*ad* IV.1; 2005, pp. 634–643). Actually, if SŚSS is the first work of MS, the first part of the fourth chapter really seems to be the pattern on which MS built the discussion at the opening section of VKL. The two sections are almost identical in many parts. I notice only very minor changes in order or expression, such as the use of synonyms etc.

Since this discussion occupies many pages, I just extract a few less common examples to show how much in this occasion VKL is indebted to SŚSS. The analysis is the same as the one recalled above concerned with GAD *ad* BG II.13 vs. SB I and regards the conception of *mokṣa* in several *darśanas*. MS, after presenting all the rival views, deals with the view of the *aupaniṣadāḥ*, the Advaita Vedāntins, which he believes to be the highest:



623

624 SSSS *ad* SŚ IV.1 (2005, pp. 640–641)
 625 sām̐khyās tu prakṛtipuruṣavivekāḍ
 626 anādyavivekanivṛttau taṃ puruṣaṃ
 627 prati nivṛttādhikārāyāḥ prakṛter na
 628 punas tadbhogārthā pravṛttir iti
 629 trividhaduḥkhas-
 630 yaikāntikātyantanirodha eva
 631 svabhāvataḥ kevalasya puruṣasya
 632 kaivalyam iti. pātāñjalās tu
 633 prakṛtipuruṣa-
 634 vivekenābhyāsavairāgyaparipākāḍ
 635 yamaniyamāsanaprāñāyāma-
 636 pratyāhāradhārañādhyaṇa-
 637 samprajñātasamādhipūrvakāt
 638 parameśvaraprasāḍajāt
 639 pañcavidhānāṃ cittavṛttināṃ nirodhāḍ
 640 eva dharmameghaśabditāḍ
 641 asamprajñātasamādheḥ kaivalyam
 642 iti kalpayanti. tridaṇḍinas tu
 643 jīvabrahmaṇor bhedābhedam
 644 abhyupetya
 645 jñānakarmasamuccayābhyāsāḍ eva
 646 kāraṇātmakabrahmaṇi
 647 kāryātmakajīvasya
 648 karmavāsanāśahita-
 649 bhedāṃśanivṛttirūpalayo
 650 muktir iti vadanti. brāhmaṇa
 651 paramaiśvareṇa yoga ity anye.
 652 sarataṇḍānirastaraṇgabhedena
 653 samudradvaividhyavat
 654 savikāranirvikārarūpeṇā-
 655 vāsthādvayaṃ brahmaṇaḥ parikalpya
 656 jñānakarmasamuccayābhyāsāḍ eva
 657 savikārāvasthāparityāgena
 658 nirvikārāvasthāprāptir eva mokṣa ity
 659 apare.

661 It is clear that MS borrows the entire passage from SSSS and inserts it *verbatim*
 662 in VKL. The minor differences might be due to manuscript differences and lack of a
 663 proper edition.

VKL (1962, pp. 8–9)
 sām̐khyāḥ tu prakṛtipuruṣavivekāḍ,
 anādyavivekanivṛttau taṃ puruṣaṃ
 prati caritādhikārāyāḥ prakṛter na
 punas tadbhogārthā apravṛttir⁴⁴ iti
 trividhaduḥkhasya
 ekāntātyantanirodha eva svabhāvataḥ
 kevalasyāpi puruṣasya kaivalyam ity
 āhuḥ. pātāñjalāḥ, tu prakṛti-
 puruṣavivekenābhyāsavairāgyapa-
 ripākāḍ yamaniyamāsanaprāñāyāma-
 pratyāhāradhārañādhyaṇa
 samprajñātasamādhipūrvakāt
 parameśvaraprasāḍanāt
 pañcavidhānāṃ cittavṛttināṃ
 nirodhāḍ eva dharmameghaśabditāḍ
 asamprajñātasamādheḥ kaivalyam iti
 kalpayanti. tridaṇḍinaḥ tu
 jīvabrahmaṇor bhedābhedam
 abhyupetya
 jñānakarmasamuccayābhyāsāḍ eva
 kāraṇātmakabrahmaṇi
 kāryātmakajīvasya
 karmavāsanāśahitabhedāṃśanivṛttir
 mokṣaḥ iti vadanti.
 paramaiśvaraprāptiḥ, ity anye.
 savikāranirvikārarūpeṇa
 avasthādvayaṃ brahmaṇaḥ parikalpya
 jñānakarmasamuccayābhyāsāḍ eva
 savikārāvasthāparityāgena
 nirvikārāvasthāprāptiḥ eva mokṣa ity
 apare.

⁴⁴ This seems an important modification of the VKL if compared to the published text of the SSSS. The editor of the VKL gives in note also a different reading, namely *pravṛttiḥ*, identical to SSSS, which is the correct one, since this reading conveys that once the discriminating knowledge originates in *puruṣa*, then *prakṛti* withdraws from its earlier functions towards *puruṣa* and does not approach it anymore (*na punas...pravṛttiḥ*). I would read accordingly also in the VKL.



664 II.2.4 General Remarks

665 I started my analysis by stating that any issue concerning MS's thought has to first
666 be confronted with the content of the AS. In the next sections, I shall show that
667 MS's originality is enclosed between the brackets of Advaita tradition, where a part
668 of the discussion is linked to fixed textual *topoi*, and the other part to the intellectual
669 ability of the writer. The works of MS, except for the devotional ones, treat nearly
670 the same issues and thus often refer to each other, so that the above analysis could
671 be easily broadened. In many cases, the very nature of some topics compels MS to
672 use similar arguments and consequently analogous vocabulary. Notwithstanding
673 that, it seems to me that MS rarely "copied and pasted" from one text to another.⁴⁵

674 I suppose that there are two main reasons for this ability of MS to deal with a single
675 subject in different ways. First, MS pays keen attention to the addressee of the texts.
676 Even though his style is almost always quite vigorous and technical, it has a margin of
677 change in accordance to the aim of the text and to the possible reader. In fact, for
678 example, the style and language of GAD, MST and BBR are much easier compared to
679 those of VKL and SB. On the other hand, both of these texts seem a great deal simpler if
680 compared to the intricate technicality of ARR and, even more than that, of AS. In fact,
681 MST and BBR are texts about *bhakti*, thus open to everyone; GAD deals with both
682 *bhakti* and *jñāna* in very straightforward terms; SB and VKL are considered by MS
683 mere textbooks for Advaita Vedānta beginners, while ARR and AS are *prauḍha-*
684 *granthas* 'mature works' for very advanced scholars.

685 The other reason could be ascribed to his own genius. While keeping his attention
686 focused on the root of the problem, MS has been capable to handle it from several
687 standpoints, each time enriching it with new examples and new vocabulary. We find
688 several clear cross-references in which MS tells us, just like a contemporary scholar,
689 that if someone wants to deepen a certain subject he can glance through another text
690 of his own. Therefore, he willingly does not need to repeat himself *verbatim*.

691 An interesting example for this practical attitude (no need to spend more time on
692 a subject that has already been analysed elsewhere) is ARR. As stated before, it is
693 quite likely that ARR is the last work of MS, since we find therein references to
694 other works, whereas ARR is not mentioned elsewhere. It refers to AS in dealing:
695 with hearing (*śravaṇa*, 1917, p. 9; *kintu sāṅgaśravaṇavidher eveti vyutpāditam*
696 *advaitasiddhau*); with the nature of the unreal (1917, p. 26; *anyathā guṇajanyatvena*
697 *pramātvāpātād ity advaitasiddhau vistaraḥ*); with reflecting (*manana*) and meditat-
698 ing (*nididhyāsana*) in two passages (1917, p. 24; *tadākāratvaṃ ca vṛttiniṣṭha eva*
699 *kaścid anirvacanīyo dharma ity advaitasiddhau vistaraḥ* and 37; *upapāditam caitad*
700 *advaitasiddhau drśyatvaheṭupāpādane*). ARR again mentions the same subject
701 pointing out that there is no reason for overextending the discussion therein, since it
702 has been treated in VKL and AS (1917, p. 44; *śabdātiriktaṃ cātmaviṣayaṃ*

⁴⁵ An exception to this are the almost identical passages of VKL (1962, pp. 3–13) and SSSS (*ad* IV.1; 2005, pp. 634–643), see Sect. II.2.3.



703 *pramāṇaṃ nāstītyādi nirūpitam advaitasiddhivedāntakalpalatayor iti neha*
704 *prapañcyate*).⁴⁶

705 III MS's Use of Advaita Material

706 III.1 Doctrinal Milieu

707 Out of BSBh flowed an enormous hermeneutical activity which occupied all the post-
708 Śaṅkara Advaita textual developments. In summary, there are three schools of
709 interpretation: the *vivaraṇaprasthāna*, originating from the *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa*
710 (hereafter PPV), a sub-commentary on Padmapāda's (IX CE) *Pañcapādikā* (hereafter
711 PP) on the BSBh; the *bhāmatīprasthāna*, originating from the *Bhāmatī* of Vācaspati Miśra
712 (X CE), another sub-commentary on Śaṅkara's BSBh, but also heavily influenced by
713 Maṇḍana Miśra's (VIII CE) *Brahmasiddhi* (hereafter BSi); and, in an earlier stage, the
714 *vārtikaprasthāna* of the *vārtikakāra* Sureśvara (IX CE), which has a direct bearing with an
715 indirect gloss and versified version of BSBh: Sarvajñātman's (IX CE) *Samkṣepa Śārīraka*
716 (hereafter SŚ). Although many other commentaries, glosses, and explanations flowered in
717 both of the main schools, the beginning of the controversy could be epitomized in the
718 double contraposition of *Brahmasiddhi-Bhāmatī* vs. *Pañcapādikā-Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa*,
719 whereas Sureśvara's school bears a closer similarity with the *vivaraṇa* one and is
720 decidedly different from Maṇḍana's position (BSi 1937, pp. xxv–lvii).

721 These three different approaches reached quite strong differences as they
722 embraced a wide range of more important issues of Advaita philosophy: the theory
723 of error (*khyātivāda*), the concepts of the individual self (*jīva*), the empirical
724 universe (*jagat*), the Lord (*īśvara*), *māyā*, *brahman*, *mokṣa*, and the means
725 (*sādhana*) to attain *mokṣa*. The more interesting and more often debated points are
726 indeed the nature of *jīva* and *īśvara*, their mutual relationship, and their relationship
727 with the world and with ignorance. The divergences of these interrelated issues
728 show the responsibility for the more philosophically oriented denomination of the
729 three schools: *pratibimbavāda* for the *vivaraṇaprasthāna*, *avacchedavāda* for the
730 *bhāmatīprasthāna* and *ābhāsavāda* for the *vārtikaprasthāna*.

734	prasthāna	Founder	other name	notes
736	<i>vivaraṇa</i>	Padmapāda	<i>pratibimbavāda</i>	
738	<i>bhāmatī</i>	Vācaspati (Maṇḍana)	<i>avacchedavāda</i>	
739	<i>vārttika</i>	Sureśvara (Sarvajñātman)	<i>ābhāsavāda</i>	closer to <i>vivaraṇa</i>

740 III.2 Influences on MS's Thought

742 Through the centuries, the internal polemic between *bhāmatī* and *vivaraṇa*
743 upholders touched on very strong points of disagreement.

⁴⁶ In the edition published by Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstrī (1997 [1937], pp. 859–883) the third *pariccheda* of AS has eight chapters, and all of them focus on *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, *jñānavidhi* and *sābdāparokṣatva*. Among these the first four (859–870) are the enlarged version of the ARR passages mentioned herein.



This internal polemical tendency seemed to decline when several opponents vigorously attacked the divided and vulnerable non-dualistic views. This new breeze shifted the attention towards new investigations (e.g., about Advaita and *bhakti* instead of *jñāna* and *karman*) and gathered all the scattered non-dualistic trends.⁴⁷ This commitment had two faces: one compilatory and the other argumentative (see above, Sect. I).

MS's AS is truly a vivid example of both these inclinations. Thus, it is a reservoir of quotations from earlier Advaitins, whose positions are discussed and strengthened by MS's lucid logic, his deep exegetic understanding and his precise *navya* style. The quantity of quotations, references and hints to other non-dualist writers helps us identify which of the Advaita texts and authors were more relevant during the period of MS's personal śāstric training and which sources he usually consulted and had at hand. Along with Śaṅkara, he demonstrates in-depth knowledge of and often resorts to Sureśvara⁴⁸ (Divanji 1933, pp. XCII–XCVIII) and his supposed disciple Sarvajñātman (Divanji 1933, pp. C–CVI) as well as to Padmapāda (Divanji 1933, pp. XCI–XCII) and Prakāśātman (XI CE; Divanji 1933, pp. CVII–CVIII), Maṇḍana Mīśra and Vācaspati Mīśra (Divanji 1933, pp. XCVIII–XCIX), Śrīharsa, Vimuktātman (XI CE; Divanji 1933, p. C), Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭāraka (XI–XII CE; fl. 1150 ca., Potter 2006, p. 512), Amalānanda Sarasvatī (XIII CE; Divanji 1933, p. CVIII), Munīndra Ānandapūrṇa (alias Vidyāsāgara, fl. 1350 ca.), Vidyāraṇya (XIV CE; Divanji 1933, pp. CX–CXVII), Rāmādvaya (XIV CE), Nṛsiṃhāśrama and Appayya Dīkṣita (XVI CE; Divanji 1933, pp. CXXI–CXXII).⁴⁹ Nevertheless, he seems to be particularly influenced by Citsukha,⁵⁰ a follower of *vivaraṇaprasthāna*. Citsukha's *magnum opus* is TP. The primary aim of this work is to refute the realistic points of view, be it of the Naiyāyikas or of the *vaiṣṇava* types of Vedāntins, which were emerging during Citsukha's period. It seems that the first objective of VT's NA was to refute TP.

In SB, following the *ābhāsavāda*, MS justifies the view according to which the *brahman* could be both *jīva* and *īśvara* (SB 1986, pp. 42–45). Moreover, following Sureśvara's line of interpretation, MS replies to the objection that someone should attain immediate liberation once he knows the object previously covered by ignorance. He says that in this case *avidyā* is not completely nullified but simply overpowered by a mental modification (*vṛtti*), the nature of which is opposite to the

⁴⁷ Minkowski (2011, pp. 215–216) writes that the strong division between *vivaraṇa* and the *bhāmātī* is difficult to draw for this era. Although Appayya is said to have been under Nṛsiṃhāśrama's influence, he writes the *Parimala*, on the *Vedāntakalpataru*, a commentary on the *Bhāmātī*. Nṛsiṃhāśrama, on the other hand, writes the *Bhāvaprakāśikā*, a gloss on *Vivaraṇa*, but also a gloss on *Samkṣepa Śārīraka*, notoriously a text in the Sureśvara line.

⁴⁸ MS, quoting Sureśvara, calls him *vārtikakṛt* (ARR 1917, p. 5), *vārtikakārapāda* (SB 1986, pp. 43, 53; AS 1997, pp. 556, 558), *vārtikakāra* (SB 1986, p. 90) or his work *vārtika* (SB 1986, p. 150), *vārtikāmṛta* (SB 1986, p. 40; AS 1997, p. 467). See Divanji (1933, pp. 113–115) and Saha (2011, p. 72).

⁴⁹ Some scholars accept Appayya to be a younger contemporary of MS. Some others consider Appayya elder. According to tradition they met each other during the pilgrimage of Appayya to Kāśī, where he went accompanied by Nṛsiṃhāśrama (Minkowski 2011, pp. 216, 223–225). In any case, the dates and the mutual relationships among these authors are still being debated.

⁵⁰ The particularity of Citsukha, beside his earlier use of what will later be called *Navya Nyāya*, is that he treats all the *pūrvapakṣas* at a stretch and only having exhausted them he replies with the entire *uttarapakṣa*. This kind of presentation, usually called *mahāpūrvapakṣa*, is already used by Rāmānuja in his *Śrībhāṣya* (thanks to Elisa Freschi for this information). MS, as well as Appayya, quotes Citsukha's TP several times.



ignorance related to that particular condition. On the contrary, liberation can only be attained when *avidyā* is completely subjugated through the knowledge of *brahman* arising from the upaniṣadic *mahāvākyas*, that same *brahman* which is the object of *avidyā* (ŚŚ I.319). If ignorance concerning a particular object is the antecedent absence of its knowledge (*jñānaprāgabhāva*, SB 1986, pp. 62–64), then it should be accepted that there are countless instances of ignorance which need to be sublated before attaining liberation (SB 1986, p. 153).

MS is an *ekajīvavādin-drṣṭisrṣṭivādin* (see Das 1977, p. 151), and very near to the *vivaraṇaprasthāna*'s positions. Nevertheless, faithful to his harmonizing attempt, he tries to defend and justify also those of Maṇḍana Mīśra and Vācaspati, to whom sometimes he refers (Divanji 1933, p. XCIX). Having once demonstrated his accord with Sarvajñātman and other *vivaraṇa* thinkers about *brahman* being the locus as well as the object of *avidyā*, MS also interprets Vācaspati's view according to which *brahman* is the object/content of *avidyā* and *jīva* is its locus (BSBh/B/VK/KP 2000, pp. 2–3). The *vivaraṇa* followers find fault with mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*) in Vācaspati's opinion, because if *avidyā* is responsible for the distinction between *jīva* and *īśvara*, it cannot be located in its own effect, i.e. the *jīva*, which is supposed to be subsequent to *avidyā* itself: in this way *avidyā* is located in the individual selves and is at the same time their cause. MS simply affirms that it is not possible to search for a sequence or chronology among *avidyā* and *jīva*, because both are without beginning (*anādi*), and as regards entities without beginning the flaws of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*), circularity (*cakrakāśraya*) or *regressus ad infinitum* (*anavasthā*; AS 1998, p. 585) cannot be postulated. Similarly, when MS states that only the single individual self whose ignorance is dispelled attains liberation, he justifies also the doctrine according to which there are as many *avidyās* as there are *jīvas* (ARR 1917, p. 6).

prasthāna* locus of *avidyā* content of *avidyā

vivaraṇa *brahman* *brahman*

bhāmatī *jīva* *brahman*

III.3 The Definitions of Falsity in the AS

I shall now try to show how MS cites, refers to, reads and interprets his Advaitin predecessors based mainly on the first sections of AS, which are concerned with the establishment of the falsity of the empirical world (*prapañcamithyātva*). In general, Advaitins' texts profusely cite upaniṣadic passages, greatly borrowing hermeneutical material from the commentarial tradition from Śaṅkara onwards. I will here focus on Advaita independent treatises (*prakaraṇa*) literature derived from the *prasthāna-trayī* (i.e., *Upaniṣads*, BS and BG) and its *bhāṣya* tradition.⁵¹

⁵¹ In a useful scheme regarding the citations in GAD, Saha (2011, pp. 370–371) lists all the instances where MS quotes earlier *ācāryas* in his commentary on the BG: Śaṅkara (*upodghāta* 1, II.17–18, II.25, II.41, II.48, II.56, III.2, III.20, III.34, IV.6, IV.18, IV.21, IV.24, IV.34, IV.37, VI.14, VI.29, VIII.24, XIII.2, XIII.12, XVII.10, XVII.16, XVII.28, XVIII.6, XVIII.12, XVIII.14, XVIII.37, XVIII.66, XVIII.67 and XVIII.75, including both implicit and explicit quotations from the *bhāṣyas* on BG and *Upaniṣads*),



The title of the AS hides a polemical vein. Establishment (*siddhi*), in fact, presupposes the refutation of other's positions.⁵² I do suspect that *siddhi* texts represent a peculiar type of polemical philosophical literature, which is still to be properly researched.⁵³

As a matter of fact, MS starts quoting earlier (*prācām*) Advaitins after the *incipit* of AS where—without acknowledging the exact source—he quotes the well-known inference (*prayoga*) proving the falsity of the empirical world (*prapañcamithyātva*). One of the first occurrences of this kind of inference is variously presented in Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭāraka's⁵⁴ three texts: *Nyāyamakaranda* (hereafter NM), *Pramāṇamālā* (hereafter PM) and *Nyāyadīpāvalī* (hereafter ND):

AS (1997, pp. 30–31)

evaṃ vipratipattau prācām prayogāḥ—
vimatam mithyā drśyatvāt, jaḍatvāt,
paricchinnatvāt śūktirūpyavad iti.
nāvayaveṣv āgrahaḥ.

NM (1901–1907, p. 128), PM (1907, p. 11) ND (1907, p. 1)

sati caivaṃ prapañco 'pi syād
avidyāvijṛmbhitaḥ/
jādyadrśatvahetubhyāṃ
rajatasvapnadṛśyavat// (NM)
sati caivaṃ prapañco 'pi syād
avidyāvinirmitaḥ/ avidyāto vibhinnatve
jaḍatvād rajjusarpavat//
jādyadrśatvahetubhyāṃ mithyātvaṃ
vā prasādhyatām/ prāg ukta eva
drṣtānto mithyātve ceha bādhyatām//
(PM)

vivādapadaṃ mithyā, drśyatvāt. yad
itthaṃ tat tathā.
yathobhayavādyavivādapadaṃ
rajatam. tathaitat, tatas tathā (ND).

Footnote 51 continued

Ānandagiri (implicit indication IV.6), Śrīdharasvāmin (II.41, VI.27 and two implicit indications ad XIII.12 and XVIII.12), Rāmānuja (implicit indication XIII.12). See also Saha (2011, pp. 117–121).

⁵² The very opening of AS (1997, pp. 8, 14) clears up this attitude: *tatrādvaitasiddher dvaitamithyātvapūrvakatvāt dvaitamithyātvam eva prathamam upapādanīyam. upapādanam ca svapakṣasādhana-parapakṣanirākaraṇābhyāṃ bhavātīti* “There, since the establishment of non-duality is possible only after having previously established the falsity of duality, first the falsity of duality alone should be proved; and this very proving takes place through the establishment of one's own positions and the refutation of others' positions” (See Pellegrini 2014: 4).

⁵³ Nair (1990, pp. 13–17) lists and briefly presents sixteen *siddhi* texts with an Advaita point of view. Nonetheless, this kind of philosophical genre is quite ancient and diffused, for example Vasubandhu's *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, Maṇḍana's *Sphoṭasiddhi*, Ratnakīrti's *Apoḥasiddhi* and Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhi, Yāmuna's *Īśvarasiddhi* and *Samvitsiddhi*, Udayana's *Prabodhasiddhi*, etc. See also the introduction of Kuppaswami Sastri to his edition of BSi (1937, pp. xxi–xxiv).

⁵⁴ Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭāraka is remembered among Advaita influential writers for his three main works: *Nyāyamakaranda*, *Pramāṇamālā* and *Nyāyadīpāvalī*. He is believed to be a disciple of Vimuktātman since the latter's *Iṣṭasiddhi* I.36 (1986, p. 135) is quoted in PM (1907, p. 4), where the quotation is preceded by *ata evoktaṃ gurubhiḥ*. Yet, this is still being debated (Mahadevan 2003, pp. 139–140).



Of the three versions of the *prapañcamithyātva* inference by Ānandabodha, the first two are very similar and in metric form, while the third one is in prose. If one changes the metric version into prose, the inference would sound like: *prapañco 'vidyāvijrmbhitah/ avidyāvīnirmitah, jaḍatvād dṛśyatvāt, rajatasvapnādīdṛśyavat*. The PM metric version adds a specification (*viśeṣaṇa*) to the probans “insentience” (*jaḍatva*): *avidyāto vibhinnatve*, “being different from ignorance”. This is to specify that the universe is insentient like ignorance, but it is different from it, because it is its result. Ānandabodha uses two *hetus* in the NM and one in the PM. Nevertheless, in the second stanza he states that falsity can be established either through “insentience” and/or through its “being an object of perception” (*dṛśyatva*). The examples are nearly the same. Nonetheless, in NM he includes also “dream objects” (*svapnadṛśya*) as a positive instance (*sapakṣa*). These two inferences, however, correspond to that of the ND, which seems to be the one intended by MS. In fact, in ND’s prose version the syllogism is five-membered, as prescribed in Nyāya (NS I.1.32): “The object under consideration [= the empirical universe] is false” (*pratijñā: vivādapadam mithyā*); “because it is an object of perception” (*hetu: dṛśyatvāt*); “what is like this [= object of perception] is like that [= false],⁵⁵ just as the silver [erroneously perceived while one is in fact looking at a piece of shiny mother-of-pearl] which is agreed on by both the debaters” (*udāharaṇa: yad itthaṃ tat tathā. yathobhayavādyavivādapadam rajatam*); “and so/such [= false] it is this [= the object under consideration]” (*upanaya: tathaitat*) and “therefore it [= the object under consideration] is like that [= false]” (*nigamana: tatas tathā*). In this case Ānandabodha uses just one *probans*, i. e. *dṛśyatva*.

The left side of the above chart shows MS’s version of the inference. In it, MS adds another *probans* to those already used by Ānandabodha, namely “being limited” (*paricchinnavatva*). Also, the example is the same, although the way of expressing it mentions the object of the perceptual error—the silver (*rūpya*)—along with its locus—the nacre (*śukti*). This is clearly a slightly re-interpreted representation of Ānandabodha’s inference. MS then adds *nāvayaveṣv āgrahaḥ* “There is no insistence about the members [of the syllogism]”. This means that for MS it does not matter how many members the syllogism has and that he possibly refers to the ND formulation of the syllogism.

Let us now switch to a very important section of AS: the five (*pañca*) definitions of falsity (*mithyātva*), a stock-topic of Vedānta since the time of Padmapāda and Vācaspati. All these definitions are quotations from earlier texts. MS acknowledges his indebtedness but defends and interprets these definitions with his own taste. This is evident in the extremely concise passages that MS cites from his predecessors. The importance of the quotation is, at any rate, qualitative more than quantitative, and it stands exactly in the spirit of defence, discussion and re-interpretation which pervades AS. It is not accidental that the first three out of the five definitions of falsity are placed within *pūrvapakṣas* or very briefly at their opening. This is easily understandable because in the introductory section of NA’s refutation of *mithyātva* VT refers to and sums up all the earlier understanding of falsity quoting eleven definitions from various sources (NA 2002, pp. 12–13). MS selects only five of these definitions and aims at re-

⁵⁵ This part of the example corresponds to the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*), which could be viewed as *yad yad dṛśyaṃ tat tan mithyā*.



878 establishing their validity. The other definitions, along with VT's objections, are
879 ignored by MS as, perhaps, obviously faulty or lacking any substantial value.⁵⁶

880 The original source of the first definition of falsity is Padmapāda's *Pañcapādikā*
881 (hereafter PP). More specifically, MS replies *in primis* to VT's objections and VT
882 quotes Padmapāda. In any case, it is likely that MS while refuting VT, had in front of
883 him not only NA, but also the source text that originally hosted the definition under:
886

887 AS (1998, pp. 48–49)

888 na tāvat **mithyāśabdo**
889 '**nirvacanīyatāvacana** iti
890 pañcapādikāvacanāt
891 sadasadanadhikaraṇatvarūpam
892 anirvācyatvam.

PP (1985, pp. 23, 26; 1992, pp. 42–43; cf.
also 1985, p. 156)

mithyāśabdo dvārthaḥ—
apahnavavacanaḥ
anirvacanīyatāvacanaś ca. atra ayam
apahnavavacanaḥ [...] **mithyā** ca tad
ajñānam ca **mithyājñānam**. **mithyeti**
anirvacanīyatā ucyate.

894 Padmapāda offers a twofold signification of the word *mithyā*: “concealment”
895 (*apahnavā*) and “indefinability, indeterminableness” (*anirvacanīyatā*).⁵⁷ It means
896 that falsity (*mithyā*), i.e. ignorance, has the power to conceal (*āvaraṇa*) the nature of
897 the self and to project (*vikṣepa*) something indefinable, indeterminate either as real
898 or not-real, just like the universe.

899 At first MS places PP's definition in the *pūrvapakṣa*. He reports only part of
900 Padmapāda's statement, skipping over the “concealment” meaning of *mithyā*, and
901 concentrates his analysis on *anirvacanīyatā*. Further, he displays his own
902 understanding of *anirvacanīyatā*: “the property of not being the locus neither of
903 what is real nor of what is not real” (*sadasadanadhikaraṇatva*).

904 Both the second and third definitions are taken from PP's foremost commentary,
905 the *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa* (hereafter PPV) by Prakāśātman. The second definition of
906 falsity is undoubtedly the more complex among the five. I have partially discussed it
907 elsewhere (2011, pp. 444–451), so here I shall only show the sources of MS.

908 Again, MS puts forward the second definition (the first one in Prakāśātman's text)
909 just before the opening of the *pūrvapakṣa*:
912

913 AS (1998, p. 94)

914 **pratipannopādhau**
915 **traikālikaniṣedhapratīyogitvaṃ** vā
916 **mithyātvaṃ**.

PPV (1985, pp. 174–175; 1992, p. 106)

pratipannopādhāv
abhāvapratīyogitvaṃ eva **mithyātvaṃ**
nāma, tac ca bādhakajñāne rajataṃ
pratipannopādhāv
abhāvapratīyogitayā avabhāsatē iti
pratyakṣaṃ.

918 MS quotes the definition almost *verbatim*: “falsity is the counter-positive of the
919 constant absence of an entity in the [same] locus in which it is perceived.” The

⁵⁶ In the *pūrvapakṣa* Citsukha gives ten options of definitions for *mithyātva*. VT probably has in mind the list provided by Citsukha (TP 1974, pp. 56–57).

⁵⁷ Vācaspati's *Bhāmāṇi* expresses the same view (BSBh/ RP/B/NN 2000, p. 13).



difference with PPV is just that MS clearly specifies the nature of the absence (*niṣedha*, synonym of *abhāva*), qualifying it as “constant”⁵⁸ (*traikālika*, synonym of *atyanta*), while Prakāśātman uses the unqualified term *abhāva*, which, when not further specified, usually means *atyantābhāva*. PPV immediately applies the definition to the illusory silver wrongly cognized while looking at nacre.

An interesting issue appears a few lines further. MS has just defended his interpretation of the definition of falsity through which he is able to negate the nacre-silver example as well as the empirical world in their own locus of appearance (Pellegrini 2011, pp. 444–445). The opponent argues that the negation (*niṣedha*) of both cannot be by their own nature (*svarūpeṇa*). In the case of *śūktirūpya* the illusory silver is negated by the cognition “This is not silver, this is nacre” (*nedam rajatam, iyaṃ śuktiḥ*) and the counter-positive (*pratiyogin*) of this negation is not the illusory silver, but the empirical (*laukikapāramārthika* = *vyāvahārika*) one, because during perceptual error the illusory silver is erroneously perceived as an empirical one. Similarly, in the case of *brahman*, when its knowledge arises, the empirical world is negated but the *brahman* does not contradict the empirical (*vyāvahārika*) world, which is on an altogether different level, but rather the view that the world has an absolute (*pāramārthika*) nature.⁵⁹ But, on accepting this, there will be a contradiction (*matahāni/virodha*) with a sentence written in PPV, according to which the counter-positive of the negation of the illusory silver is that same illusory silver. The problem stands on this sentence, where MS (AS 1997, p. 123) precisely reports what is quoted by VT (NA 2002, p. 26). The reference to PPV (PPV 1985, p. 192; 1992, pp. 124–125) is, instead, rather loose:

AS (1997, p. 123)

PPV (1985, pp. 192–193; 1992, pp. 124–125)

traikālikaniṣedhaṃ prati
svarūpeṇāpaṇasthaṃ rūpyaṃ
pāramārthikatvākāreṇa prātibhāsikaṃ
vā pratiyogīti.

nanu tarhi ‘pūrvaṃ rajatam abhūd idānīm
na’ iti ghaṭavat **kālabhedena niṣedhaḥ**
syāt. na,
laukikaparamārtharajatasyātra
kālatraye ’pi śūnyatvāt tadapekṣayā
nirupādhikaniṣedhasiddheḥ.

In some previous sentences, however, MS quotes *verbatim et literatim* a passage from TP which contains the same idea expressed by PPV:

⁵⁸ For this translation of *atyantābhāva* I rely on Sureśvara’s gloss, see *infra* in section III.3, after the BṛUBhV quote.

⁵⁹ It should be reminded that MS negates the absolute ontic status of the world, not its empirical one which is established by the means of knowledge. He also affirms that two entities contradict each other only when they pertain to the same level of reality, not otherwise.



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AS (1997, pp. 124–128)
tad uktam tattvapradīpikāyām—‘tasmāl
laukikaparamārtharajatam eva nedam
rajatam iti niṣedhapratīyogīti
pūrvācāryāṇām vācoyuktir api
purovartini rajatārthinaḥ
pravṛttidarśanāt laukikaparamārtha
rajatatvenāparokṣatayā pratītasya
kālatraye ’pi
laukikaparamārtharajatam idam na
bhavatīti niṣedhapratīyogitām
aṅgīkṛtya netavyeti.

TP (1974, p. 139)
tasmāl laukikapa
ramārtharajatam eva nedam
rajatam iti niṣedhapratīyogīti
pūrvācāryāvācoyuktir api purovartini
rajatārthinaḥ pravṛttidarśanāl⁶⁰
laukikarajatātmatvenāparokṣatayā
pratītasya kālatraye ’pi laukikapa
ramārtharajatam idam na bhavatīti
niṣedhapratīyogitām aṅgīkṛtya
netavyā.

972 Both MS and Citsukha affirm that there is no contradiction to PPV, because what
973 is meant by Prakāśātman’s statement is that the counter-positive of the negation is
974 indeed the illusory silver, simply misunderstood as identical with the empirical one.
975 It does not matter if this silver is negated by its own nature (*svarūpeṇa*) or
976 absolutely (*pāramārthikatvena*) (AS 1997, pp. 123–124). Therefore, continues MS,
977 when Prakāśātman maintains that the empirical silver is negated, he is taking the
978 negation as a mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva*) which resides in (= “whose adjunct
979 [*anuyogin*] is”) the illusory silver (Bhattacharya 1992, pp. 82–84).

980 As stated above, the third definition of falsity also comes from PPV. Also on this
981 occasion MS quotes Prakāśātman not literally but, conforming to VT’s reconstruc-
982 tion (NA 2002, p. 37), he displays only Prakāśātman’s intended meaning framed
983 into a shorter statement,⁶¹ immediately followed by a *pūrvapakṣa*. MS himself, in
984 any case, is aware of the PPV statement because he quotes it *literatim* a few lines
985 later, merely inverting the order of the adjectives *vartamānena* and *pravilīnena*:
986

989 AS (1997, pp. 160, 164–168)
990 jñānanivartyatvaṃ vā mithyātvam [...] ucyate—ajñānasya svakāryeṇa
991 ajñānasya svakāryeṇa pravilīnena
992 vartamānena vā saha jñānena nivṛttir
993 bādhaḥ.

PPV (1985, p. 178; 1992, p. 108)
ucyate—ajñānasya svakāryeṇa
vartamānena pravilīnena vā saha
jñānena nivṛttir bādhaḥ.

995 Hence, falsity is that which is contradicted once and for all by knowledge.
996 Whatever appears to be the content of an erroneous cognition and subsequently
997 ceases with the valid cognition of the real nature of that content is false.

998 Just after this citation, MS quotes a passage from Sureśvara’s BrUBhV (I.1.183),
999 again *verbatim*, with the two usual “quotation marks”: *uktam* and *iti*. This is of course
1000 just an example of the attention paid by MS in quoting Sureśvara. MS cites Sureśvara’s
1001 BrUBhV several times throughout his Advaita works, and usually *verbatim*.

⁶⁰ The edited text of the TP reads *pravṛttidarśanālaikikarajatātmatvena*, which does not make sense in this context.

⁶¹ I believe that the reformulation of the PPV passage was already well-established by the time of VT, because we find it in TP’s *mithyātvānirūpaṇa* (1974, p. 56) and in a slightly modified version in *anirvacanīyāvidyānirūpaṇa* (1974, pp. 92, 97), where Citsukha defines ignorance.



1003

1004 AS (1997, p. 168)
1005 vārtikakṛdbhiś cōktam—
1006 **tat tvam asy ādi-**
1007 **vākyotthasamyagdhījanmamātrataḥ/**
1008 **avidyā saha kāryeṇa nāsīd asti**
1009 **bhaviṣyati//** iti.

BrUBhV I.1.183 (1982, p. 47)
tat tvam asy ādivākyotthasamyag-
dhījanmamātrataḥ/ avidyā
saha kāryeṇa nāsīd asti bhaviṣyati//

1011 Here it seems that MS wants to corroborate PPV's statement, which treats the
1012 terms *nivṛtti* and *bādhā* as synonyms of constant absence (*atyantābhāva*), with the
1013 stanza of Sureśvara, again reinforcing the idea that the constant absence is indeed
1014 the absence connected with the three layers of time: "Just by the birth of the valid
1015 mental modification arisen from the sentence 'You are That', ignorance along with
1016 [its] effect [is experienced as] 'There was not, there is not, there will not be'!".

1017 I have discussed elsewhere (2011, pp. 451–455) the fourth definition of falsity,
1018 therefore I shall just briefly see how MS quotes it from TP. MS, unlike the usual
1019 scheme, on this occasion formulates the definition and immediately thereafter shows
1020 its real purport (it is noteworthy that also VT (NA 2002, p. 41) confutes not the
1021 definition but only its purport). In fact, MS does not feel the need to start directly
1022 with a *pūrvapakṣa* because, due to the extreme similarity of the second and fourth
1023 definitions, the major objections are displayed and replied within the discussion of
1024 the second definition.

1028 AS (1997, pp. 182–183)
1029 **svāśrayaniṣṭhātyantābhāva-**
1030 **pratiyogitvaṃ vā mithyātvam.**
1031 svātyantābhāvādhikaraṇa eva
1032 pratiyāmanatvam.

TP (1974, p. 67)
sarveṣāṃ api bhāvanām āśrayatvena
saṃmate/ **pratiyogitvam**
atyantābhāvaṃ prati **mṛṣātmatā// 7 //**
tathā hi—paṭādinām bhāvanām
svāśrayatvenābhimatāḥ tantvādayo ye
tanniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratyogitayaiva
teṣāṃ mithyātvam.

1034 Evidently, MS quotes *ad sensum* Citsukha's metric and prose versions of the
1035 definition, synthesizing it into a pure abstraction, without mentioning the "cloth and
1036 other objects" (*paṭādi*) given in TP's text. Beside the synonyms used, and beside the
1037 fact that MS's version is expressed with a compound while both Citsukha's versions
1038 are more dismembered, MS precisely interprets Citsukha's point, except for a
1039 philosophically not irrelevant adjective: *saṃmate* in metric and *-abhimatāḥ* in prose.
1040 Both these determinations convey the idea that a false entity does not exist, even in
1041 the only locus where it is supposed to be (*saṃmata/abhimata*). In *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*
1042 (hereafter VP) Dharmarāja Adhvarin (VP 2000, p. 239) writes that without
1043 *abhimata* there will result the flaw of impossibility (*asaṃbhava*) in the definition. In
1044 fact, when something is not perceived or found in its own locus it is understood as
1045 impossible. If we add the adjective *abhimata* to the locus (*āśraya*), it will result that
1046 the locus is not a real one but just a supposed one under particular conditions. For
1047 example, in the classical instance of the nacre-silver, the only possible locus for the
1048 illusory silver is the nacre, but the nacre is not the real locus of silver because it is



just supposed to be so in that particular situation. Therefore, from Dharmarāja's treatment, it seems that something has gone wrong in MS's quotation. It might also be that MS recognized a weakness of the definition and therefore focused on rescuing its intended meaning, rather than its form (whereas at a later time Dharmarāja focused on rescuing the form of the definition by stressing the role of *abhimata-sammata*).

Finally, MS gives a fifth definition of falsity taking the idea again from Ānandabodha's ND (1907, p. 1):

AS (1997, p. 195)
sadviviktatvaṃ vā mithyātvam.

ND (1907, p. 1)
satyavivekasya mithyābhāvasya
sādhyatvān nāprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatā,
nāpasiddhānto 'pi, satyam abādhyam,
bādhyam mithyeti tadvivekaḥ.

First of all, in ND formulation the *definiendum* (*lakṣya*) is *mithyābhāva*, where the term *-bhāva* is a substitute for an abstract suffix (*bhāvapratyaya*, PA V.1.119: *tasya bhāvas tvalau*, referring to *tva* and *taL*). So, interpreting the compound word *mithyābhāva* as a *ṣaṣṭhī tatpuruṣa* (*mithyāyāḥ bhāvaḥ*) the result will lead to the identification of *mithyābhāva* with *mithyātva*. On the side of the *definiens* (*lakṣaṇa*) we have again two forms: for MS *sadviviktatva* and for Ānandabodha *satyaviveka*. I believe that these two represent the same formulation. Both are compounds (most plausibly *pañcamī tatpuruṣas*: *sataḥ viviktatvam* and *satyāt vivekaḥ*) formed by two corresponding words, but their structures are reversed as a chiasm: in MS's formulation the second term (*uttarapada*) of the compound is an abstract noun, while in Ānandabodha the first (*pūrvapada*). The two formulations are thus apparently slightly different but fundamentally identical or, in other terms, substantially MS quotes *ad sensum*, but essentially he quotes it *verbatim*.

Next follows the very technical discussion and defence of MS of the three *probans* given in his version of the *mithyātvānumana*. While explaining the purport and defending the *probans* "being an object of perception, cognisability" (*dṛśyatvaḥ*) MS quotes and re-uses Advaitins' earlier material. The centre of the discussion is how to interpret the word *dṛśyatva*, that is, "to have a formal content" or "to be describable" or "to be a cognisable property". Here *brahman* is excluded because it is without any property whatsoever and, therefore, it cannot be the content of any kind of cognition. When it is the object/content of a certain mental modification (*vṛttiviśaya*), it is in its conditioned aspect (*upahita*) and not in its pure (*anupahita*) one (Nair 1990, p. 45). For MS, in fact, only the limited and conditioned *brahman* can be the object of a *vṛtti*. The conditioned *brahman*, as far as its conditioning adjunct (*upādhi*) is concerned, is ultimately false (*mithyā*). Moreover, while the *vṛtti* is present, the *brahman* cannot be unconditioned because that very modification becomes its *upādhi* (AS 1997, pp. 239–240). VT cites a stanza from Maṇḍana's BSi as evidence that for Advaitins also the unconditioned *brahman* is an object of a certain cognition, and the meaning of the word *dṛśya* applies to it as well. So, for VT the definition of falsity is exceedingly extended (*ativyāpta*) so as to include also *brahman*. MS replies to VT by quoting the same



1094 stanza in the same way and affirms that BSi's statement only refers to the
 1095 conditioned *brahman* (*upahitapara*). MS's quotation is embedded into the classical
 1096 formula *na ca... vācyam*. It is curious, however, that the three texts (including two
 1097 editions of AS) report the passage with very minor differences:⁶²
 1098

1101	VT (NA: 2002, p. 51)	AS (1997, p. 240; NA: 2002, p. 51)	BSi IV.3 (1937, p. 157)
1102	sarvapatryayavedye	na ca— sarvapatryayavedye	sarvapatryayavedye vā
1103	ca brahmarūpe	'smin brahmarūpe	brahmarūpe vyavasthite/
1104	vyavasthite ity	vyavasthite iti	prapañcasya pravilayaḥ
1105	ādisvavacanavirodhaś	svavacanavirodha iti vācyam,	śabdena pratipādyate// 3 //
1106	ca syāt.	tasyāpy upahitaparatvāt (AS). na ca— sarvapatryayavedye vā brahmarūpe vyavasthite iti (NA).	

1108 On this point there are some further considerations. MS maintains that in the very
 1109 moment when pure consciousness becomes the object of a *vr̥tti* it does not remain
 1110 pure. He cannot accept VT's option that the *vr̥tti* becomes its own content,
 1111 according to which in its ultimate stage the *vr̥tti* cognises the conditioned
 1112 consciousness and, since every other conditioning factor is absent, that limitation is
 1113 nothing but the ultimate *vr̥tti* itself. In fact, explains MS, since it is born out of a
 1114 verbal cognition of upaniṣadic sentences, the final *vr̥tti* must necessarily concern
 1115 those words. That *vr̥tti* is the ultimate undivided mental modification (*akhaṇḍākā-*
 1116 *rav̥rtti*) with *brahman* as its content. This *vr̥tti*, even though it is the ultimate one
 1117 (*carama*), is nevertheless—being a *vr̥tti*—a product of ignorance. Thus, the *vr̥tti*
 1118 cannot completely remove ignorance (Gupta 2006, pp. 34–35).

1119 To corroborate this point, MS quotes a statement which he explicitly attributes to
 1120 Amalānanda Sarasvatī's *Vedāntakalpataru* (hereafter B/VK), a gloss on the
 1121 *Bhāmātī*:
 1122

1125	AS (1997, pp. 259–261)	B/VK (2000, p. 57)
1126	tad uktam kalpatarukṛdbhiḥ—śuddham	nirupādhi brahmeti viṣayīkurvāṇā
1127	brahmeti viṣayīkurvāṇā vr̥ttiḥ	vr̥ttiḥ svasvetaropādhinivr̥tīhetur
1128	svasvetaropādhinivr̥tīhetur udayate,	udayate, svasyā apy upādhitvāviśeṣāt.
1129	svasyā apy upādhitvāviśeṣāt. evaṃ ca	tataḥ svasattāyāṃ vināśahetusāmnidhyād
1130	nānupahitasya viṣayatā, vr̥ttyuparāgo	vinaśadavasthatvam. evaṃ ca
1131	'tra sattayopayujyate, na bhāsyatayā	nānupahitasya viṣayatā, na copādher
1132	viṣayakotiṣeṇeti.	nirvartakāntarāpekṣeti bhāvaḥ [...] vr̥ttyuparāgo 'tra sattayopayujyate na pratibhāsyatayāto vr̥ttisamsarge satyātmā viṣayo bhavati, na tu svata iti na doṣaḥ.

⁶² MS refers to Maṇḍana again while discussing the *probans* “limitation” (*paricchinatva*), cf. BSi II.31 (1937, p. 72) and AS (1997, pp. 317–318).



What is noteworthy here is that MS reports B/VK almost *verbatim* but skips over a few sentences included into Amalānanda's text, only quoting what is essential for his analysis.

B/VK says that while the ultimate *ṛtti* cognises the conditioned aspect of the pure *brahman* without cognising itself, it becomes the cause (*hetu*) for its own withdrawal and also for the withdrawal of other conditioning adjuncts similar to itself (*svasvetaropādhinivṛtti*) because that *ṛtti*, too, is a conditioning adjunct (*upādhitva*) which limits the consciousness. Therefore, the unconditioned *brahman* is not an object of any kind of *ṛtti*.⁶³ Moreover, concludes MS, the appearing connection (*uparāga*) with the *ṛtti* is due to the presence of that very *ṛtti* as *upādhi*, and not to the *ṛtti* being its own object/content. So the *ṛtti* is not its own content (*svaviśayaka*) but has as its content the conditioned *brahman*.

At the end of the first part of this section on the *probans* of the *mithyātvānumāna*, MS discusses also a fourth *hetu* given in TP, namely “being endowed with parts” (*amśitva*). Also on this occasion, MS quotes Citsukha's entire inference. Again, Citsukha first formulates the inference in a stanza (I.8) and later in prose. MS quotes *ad sensum* because again he mixes up some words from the metric version and some from the prose one. The *hetu* concerned is *amśitva* and it is used in the stanza, while in the prose version the *hetu* is a synonym, i.e., *avayavitva*:

AS (1997, pp. 322–323)
citsukhācāryais tu ayam **paṭa**
etattantuniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogī
aṁśitvāt, itarāṁśivat ity uktam.

TP I.8 (1974, p. 69)
aṁśinaḥ **svāṁśagātyantābhāvasya**
pratiyoginaḥ/ aṁśitvād itarāṁśiva dig
eṣaiva guṇādiṣu// 8 //
vimataḥ **paṭaḥ**
etattantuniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogī
avayavitvāt paṭāntaravat.

At the end of this section, MS quotes another inference for proving the falsity of the word. Its author is—according to MS—Ānandapūrṇa Munīndra, author of ten texts (Yogīndrānanda 1992, p. 9), among them the *Nyāyacandrikā* (hereafter NC) and an important commentary on *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya*, the *Khaṇḍanaphakkikā* better known as *Vidyāsāgarī*.⁶⁴ Unfortunately, I could not trace the inference quoted by MS in Vidyāsāgara's main works, which both contain a section on *mithyātva*. At any rate, this is what MS quotes:

In this way, it is correct also what has been said by Vidyāsāgara: “The object under examination apart from knowledge is unreal, because it is not cognisable apart from knowledge, like dreams etc.”⁶⁵

⁶³ In one of the sentences not quoted by MS, Amalānanda adds that the conditioning ultimate *ṛtti* does not cause any other *ṛtti* to arise (*na copādher nirvartakāntarāpekṣeṭi*).

⁶⁴ NC is mainly a text devoted to reply to the attacks directed to Advaita by Jaya Tīrtha's *Nyāyasudhā*; on the other hand, the *Khaṇḍanaphakkikā* is, as the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya* itself, a reply to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika positions.

⁶⁵ AS (1997, p. 325): *evaṁ ca—vimataḥ jñānavyātirekeṇāsāt jñānavyātirekeṇānupalabhyamānatvāt svapnādivat iti vidyāsāgaroktam api sadhu*.



MS says that this inference is correct. According to him the *probandum*, namely *jñānavyātirekeṇa asattva*, is tantamount to any of the previously given five definitions of falsity. The *probans* of this inference, *jñānavyātirekeṇa anupalabhyamānatva*, means that the empirical world is only cognisable if the light of consciousness is reflected on the internal organ (*cidābhāsa*) to illumine it. The *cidābhāsa* is the appearance of consciousness where naturally there is none; it is consciousness limited to itself (*svāvacchinnacit*, LC 1997, p. 325).⁶⁶ Therefore, *jñānavyātirekeṇa anupalabhyamānatva* means not to be perceived without the aid of the consciousness limited by itself, or better, being different from that which is illuminated regardless of consciousness limited to itself. For what is independently effulgent is the self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*) *brahman* alone.⁶⁷

At the very end of this passage, MS alludes to the validity of other inferences used by other *ācāryas* without giving any specific reference.⁶⁸ In this case, exceptionally, VT does not refer to the inference of NC but rather to two inferences to the same effect taken from the *Vedāntakaumudī* (hereafter VK) of Rāmādvaya:

NA (2002, p. 87)
yat tu “vimatam mithyā dhīkāla
evānyathāpramitatvāc
citranimnonnatādivat”.
“bhārūpavastusaṃlagnatvāt
savitr̥chhidravat”.

VK (1955, pp. 91–92)
kalpitaś cāyaṃ pratītisamaya eva
anyathā pramitatvāt
citranimnonnatādivat (91) vigītaḥ
kalpito bhārūpasvasaṃlagnatvena
bhāsamānatvāt savitr̥chhidravat (92).

The reference is clear. The more obvious reason for the small differences could be seen in these ways: VT had at his disposal a manuscript presenting those readings or he is quoting *ad sensum*, or maybe just remembering what he had previously studied. Although finding a solution is not easy, following the interpretation given by MS to Vidyāsāgara’s inference, I think that VT used a more correct manuscript of the VK than the actually available edition. For, I prefer his reading of the *probans* of the second inference (*-vastusaṃlagna-*, “connected with reality”), instead of that of Subrahmanya Śāstrī’s edition of the VK (1955, p. 92: *-svasaṃlagna-*, “connected with itself”). Here, in fact, the texts intend that an inert object only becomes manifest once it is illuminated by a luminous entity (*bhārūpa*), which according to MS is nothing other than the self.

I will directly illustrate MS’s quotation of Citsukha’s definition of falsity in the *caturthamithyātvā* section (AS 1997, pp. 182–194; Pellegrini 2011, pp. 451–455). Connected with this is also the total accord and consequent defence by MS (AS, 1998, pp. 544–547) of Citsukha’s definition of ignorance (*avidyā*) (TP 1974, p. 97) as a positive entity (*bhāvarūpa*). In order to establish the positive status of *avidyā*, MS quotes (AS 1997, pp. 566, 567) two other TP’s inferences (1974, p. 98):

⁶⁶ AS (1997, p. 325): *jñānavyātirekeṇānupalabhyamānatvaṃ cidābhāse saty evopalabhyamānatvaṃ hetur iti na kiṃcid anupapannam*.

⁶⁷ I follow LC for this explanation (AS/LC 1997, p. 325): *cidābhāsaṃ svāvacchinnacitaṃ vinānupalabhyamānatvaṃ, tādr̥śacitaṃ anapekṣyaiva yat prakāśate tadanyatvaṃ, svaprakāśānyatvaṃ iti yāvat*.

⁶⁸ AS (*ibid.*): *evam anyeṣāṃ api prayogā yathāyogam upapādantiyā iti*.



1215

1216 AS (1997, p. 566)
 1217 tattvapradīpikoktaṃ ca—
 1218 caitrapramā caitragata-
 1219 pramāprā-
 1220 gabhāvātiriktānādinivartikā,
 1221 pramātvān maitrapramāvat [...] iti.

TP (1974, p. 98)
devadattapramā
tatsthapramābhāvātirekiṇaḥ/
anāder dhvaṃsinī mātṛvād
avigītapramā yathā// I. 10 //
vigītaṃ
devadattaniṣṭhapramāṇajñānaṃ
devadattaniṣṭhapramā
'bhāvātiriktānāder nivartakaṃ
pramānatṛvād yajñadattādigatapramā-
ṇajñānavad ity anumānam.

1223 Here we see that MS's intention is clearly to quote the inference. The result is quite
 1224 interesting from an ecdotic point of view, but less so from a philosophical one. As usual
 1225 in his style, Citsukha opens the *uttarapakṣa* with a stanza, subsequently repeated in
 1226 philosophical prose. Nevertheless, the two renderings are substantially the same. The
 1227 inference quoted by MS, even though it seems closer to the metrical version,
 1228 corresponds to a condensed and simplified reading of both Citsukha's metrical and
 1229 prose formulations. However, MS's inference substitutes *devadatta*- ("the valid
 1230 knowledge of Devadatta") with *caitra*- ("the valid knowledge of Caitra") in the
 1231 inferential subject (*pakṣa*), and *yajñadatta*- with *maitra*- in the example (*dṛṣṭānta*).⁶⁹
 1232 The subject of the prose version of Citsukha's inference is slightly more complex:
 1233 "The knowledge under discussion risen out of the means of knowledge residing in
 1234 Devadatta." Citsukha's prose statement is, thus, more precise, insofar as it specifies
 1235 that the valid knowledge is the cognition generated by the action of the means of
 1236 knowledge and adds a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) to *-jñāna*, said to be *vigīta*
 1237 (= *vivādāspada* = *vipratipanna*) in order to strengthen that this valid knowledge is
 1238 the matter under examination. Moreover, affirming that this *pramā* is located in
 1239 Devadatta underlines more markedly the locus-located relation (*ādhārādheyabhāva*)
 1240 between the two members. The *probandum* (*sādhya*) of MS's inference is "to
 1241 eliminate [= to be the eliminator of] the beginningless [entity] different from the
 1242 antecedent absence of the valid knowledge related to Caitra". This is quite similar to
 1243 both versions of Citsukha's inference. Another small difference might be noticed: MS
 1244 repeats the proper name *caitragata*- and uses the particle *gata*- [formally the \sqrt{gam} past
 1245 participle] in composition. Citsukha, instead, uses a pronoun in substitution of
 1246 *devadatta*- in the metrical version, while in the prose inference he repeats
 1247 *devadattaniṣṭha*-. He also expresses the notion of absence without specifying, as
 1248 MS does, the antecedent (*prāk*) nature of that *abhāva*. Moreover, in both Citsukha's
 1249 versions the *probandum* is not a compound, but it is presented in an analysed form: in
 1250 prose, connected with *-jñāna*, its gender is neuter (*nirvartakam*) and in verse, together
 1251 with *-pramā*, it is feminine (*dhvaṃsinī*). MS's inference also uses a feminine, in
 1252 accordance to *-pramā*. The *probans* (*hetu*) is equal in the three versions, only deprived
 1253 of the *upasarga pra*- in Citsukha's metrical version. Last, MS uses Maitra in the
 1254 example and the same wording of the *pakṣa*: "like the valid knowledge of Maitra." In

⁶⁹ Devadatta, etc are all among the most used generic proper names for human beings.



the metric form, Citsukha places the adverb *yathā* instead of the suffix *-vat* in composition and refers to the quality of *dr̥ṣṭānta* as positive instance (*sapaḥṣa*). In the *sapaḥṣa* the existence of the *probandum* has already been established by *pramāṇas* and it is universally accepted (*avigīta* = *avipratipanna* = *saṃpratipanna*). The prose version is just a repetition of the *probandum* with the substitution of the doubtful instance relating to Devadatta with the established one of Yajñadatta.

MS quotes the second inference at a stretch, but in TP we find it after some lines of discussion. As evident here the aim of the inference is to establish ignorance as the material cause of an erroneous cognition (*bhramopādānatva*):

AS (1997, p. 566)
tattvapradīpikoktaṃ ca—[...] **vigīto**
vibhramah
etajjñānakābādhyātiriktopādānakah,
vibhramatvāt saṃmatavad iti.

TP (1974, p. 103)
prayogaś ca **vigīto vibhramah**
etajjñānakāraṇābādhyāti-
riktopādānah, vibhramatvāt
devadattādivibhramavad.

Herein, we see that the difference between MS's and Citsukha's inferences is superficially less evident. Although the *probandum* of the two inferences is literally different, as the examples are different, the intended meaning is exactly the same. Citsukha's inference is analyzable like MS's. The only difference is concentrated in the *probandum* *etajjñānakāraṇābādhyātiriktopādānatva* and in the direct mention of the victim of the erroneous cognition, i.e., Devadatta. Here the *probandum* is a *bahuvrīhi* without the suffix *-ka*. The first part is not *etajjanaka-* but *etajjñānakāraṇa-*. In MS's inference *etat* means "this erroneous cognition" (*etadbhrama*), and also the erroneous cognition is a form of *jñāna*, a kind of cognition, as stated by Citsukha. Thus, although MS's wording is different from Citsukha's, the intended meaning of both inferences is the same. The quotation is not *verbatim*, but seems *ad sensum*. However, the differences between the two could also be imputed only to the manuscript tradition. But this will be made clear in the next steps of this study.

In addition, MS (AS 1997, p. 663) quotes *verbatim et literatim* a *kārikā* by Citsukha's (TP I.19, 1974, p. 192)⁷⁰ while discussing and defending another pivotal issue: the definition of the indivisible meaning (*akhaṇḍārthalakṣaṇa*) arising out of great upaniṣadic sentences. Another quotation and discussion (AS 1997, p. 884) on a stanza from TP (IV.8, 1974, p. 602), where MS does not mention neither Citsukha's name nor his works and only uses the generic formula *tad uktam*, concerns the true nature of *ātman*, which is said to be identical with the eradication of ignorance (Pellegrini 2014: fn. 4).

IV MS's Approach to Other Schools' Texts

In all his works, MS displays a considerable acquaintance with several branches of learning and a great deal of works. Beside the intimate knowledge of Navya Nyāya,

⁷⁰ TP/NP I.19: *samsargāsamsaṃgisamyagdhīhetutā yā girām iyaṃ/ uktākhaṇḍārthatā yad vā tat-prātipādikārthatā//* "The said indivisible meaning is the causality of the words towards a valid cognition free from any relation whatsoever; or otherwise it is their [= *tat* = of those words] stem meaning alone." The same is quoted *verbatim* and discussed also in VP (2000, pp. 113–114).



his expertise in many disciplines is evident: *dharmaśāstra* mainly in GAD,⁷¹ *purāṇa-itihāsa*, grammar, *āstika* and *nāstika darśanas* in his other works. Undoubtedly the *Upaniṣads* are the first authority for an Advaita writer and so is, consequently, their direct commentarial tradition. However, MS also widely used *purāṇas* and *smṛtis*, thus elevating their authority. While this reliance is not so evident in his more polemical Advaita works (such as SB, VKL, AS and ARR), it is definitely clearer in BBR, GAD, MST, BPPP and HLV (Nair 1990, pp. 200–201).

Due to the lack of space, I analyse only selected instances. I divide the section into two parts:

(IV.1) reverse or indirect indebtedness: MS's reply to VT;

(IV.2) MS's quotations, acknowledged and unacknowledged references from other schools' texts.

IV.1 Reverse Indebtedness: NA and AS on the Definition of Falsity

I have already stressed the point that AS is a reply to VT's NA. This generates an "indirect" or "reverse indebtedness". The indebtedness can, in fact, be twofold: a direct one, which corresponds to a *sacrum furtum* where a text or a chapter heavily owes its philosophical positions, terminology and development to another text or to a group of texts, usually of the same traditional milieu. Another kind of indebtedness is that which takes a specific doctrine, a text or a group of texts and focuses its internal organization and philosophical position on a completion, rectification or refutation of it. This kind of slightly polemical attitude is what I call "reverse indebtedness". In the AS, MS accepts the terms of debate established by VT and, in putting Advaitins' arguments into the form necessary for that confrontation, he slightly alters their structure here and there (Minkowski 2011, p. 222).

This is the reason why AS is mainly a polemical reply (*vādaprasthāna*) to NA,⁷² which, in turn, is basically a polemical text answering to previous Advaita treatises.

⁷¹ MS demonstrates acute knowledge and hermeneutical ability on *dharmaśāstra* issues, which seems rather unusual for a śāṃkarian *saṃnyāsin*. See, for example, the GAD commentary on BG's first chapter until the fifth verse of the second chapter, or again GAD (2005, pp. 711–716). Minkowski (2011, p. 218), while presenting the connections between the Advaitin of the South and those of Vārāṇasī, plausibly argues that Rāmeśvara Bhaṭṭa (beginning of the XVI cen. CE) was the Advaita teacher of Mādhava Sarasvatī, one of the *gurus* of MS. Rāmeśvara established the Bhaṭṭa family in Vārāṇasī. The writings on Mīmāṃsā and Dharmaśāstra of this family are considered authoritative all over India. So, beside MS's strong *śrauta* background, it might be possible that MS acquired his admirable knowledge of Dharmaśāstra from Mādhava Sarasvatī himself. According to other traditions, the *guru* of Mādhava Sarasvatī was the son of Rāmeśvara Bhaṭṭa, Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, author of the *Prakriyāsarvasva*, partly of the *Mānomeyodaya* and *Tristhalisetu*. Following this alternative tradition, it seems that Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa defeated Nṛsiṃhāśrama in debate (Sastri-Sastri 1959, pp. 47–48). See also fn. 16.

⁷² On this issue Minkowski (2011, p. 223) plausibly argues: "MS devoted all his efforts to the argument with the Dvaitins. An explanation of MS's choice of opponent that might be in keeping with the contextual suggestions above would be that, in doing so, MS sought to take up an argument about the conceptual organization of Hinduism as a whole. Through engaging with the Dvaitins, he was attempting to [...] (re)describe Advaita as the position most amenable to providing a "large-tent" theology for the many doctrines and traditions of Hindus to a word of religious practices and beliefs that were explicitly sectarian and irreducibly divided."



Thus, a “reverse indebtedness” similar to MS’s one might be postulated also in the case of NA’s *pūrvapakṣas*.⁷³ The Advaita texts, which initially stimulated VT, have been identified in PP, PPV, TP, IS, NM, etc. (Nair 1990, p. 20). Although NA takes earlier Advaita texts as *pūrvapakṣas* and the answer of MS reflects these Advaita positions, the very text-to-text controversy began with VT (Nair 1990, p. 20). In this kind of polemical treatises, the argument and discussions are placed in order to nullify adversary’s positions, which are usually placed in a *pūrvapakṣa*. In fact, according to the rules of debate, a *pūrvapakṣa* must be somehow re-proposed or repeated (*anudita*) before being refuted.⁷⁴ Madhva’s Dvaita Vedānta is obviously a full-fledged *darśana* with a deep and wide net of doctrines and texts. Nevertheless, many of the debates and discussions presented in this textual tradition are written as a reaction to the Advaitin interpretation of *prasthānatrayī*. In the *maṅgala* verse itself, both MS and VT start by touching the pivotal point of their respective tenets: VT the reality of the world, and MS its falsity. NA intends to establish the world as *satya* rejecting the Advaitins’ *mithyātva* doctrine by attacking the philosophical foundation of *mithyātva*: the superimposition (*adhyāsa*).

Thus, on the one side stands VT’s conception of the reality of the entire universe (*satyāśeṣaviśva*), and on the other side MS’s conviction that the world of duality (*dvaitaprapaṇca*) is false (*mṛṣā*). MS individuates this falsity starting from its components/characteristics, the foremost of which is the property of being the knower (*mātrtāmukha*), that are falsely attributed to the self because of *māyā* (*māyākalpita*). Both the texts salute Viṣṇu, but while VT sees Hari as the merciful cause of the universe and the companion of his great devotee Ānanda Tīrtha (= Madhva), according to LC’s reading MS intends Viṣṇu as “the pervasive essential nature of the individual self” (LC 1997, p. 2: *viṣṇuḥ vyāpakam jīvasvarūpam*).

NA I.2 (2002, pp. 1–2)
vighaughavāraṇam
satyāśeṣaviśvasya
kāraṇam/ karuṇāsindhum
ānandatīrthabandhu**hariṃ** bhaje//

AS I.1 (1997, pp. 1–2)
māyākalpitamātrtā
mukhamṛṣādvaita-
prapañcāśrayaḥsatyajñānasukhātmakaḥ
śrutiśikhottthākhaṇḍadhigocaraḥ/
mithyābandhavidhūnanena
paramānandaikatānātmakam mokṣam
prāpta iva svayaṃ vijayate
viṣṇuvikalpojhitāḥ//

⁷³ Not only the NA’s *pūrvapakṣas* are influenced by other texts, but the position expressed by *uttarapakṣas* has often the form of quotations, references, restatements and widened discussions of preceding texts. These could be taken not only for the *śruti* and *smṛti* heritage, but also from other texts of VT, such as *Bhedojjīvana*, *Tātparyacāndrikā*; or texts of the Dvaita tradition: Madhva’s *Anuvyākhyāna* on BS, Jaya Tīrtha’s *Nyāyasudhā* and *Vādāvalī*, Viṣṇudāsa’s *Vādaratnāvalī* etc. We shall also keep in mind the acquaintance of VT with other *śāstras* and his intimate knowledge of Navya Nyāya. See Bronkhorst et al. (2013, pp. 77–81).

⁷⁴ It is a common rule of the debate that once a debater has expressed his own position, the opponent should precede his reply by shortly summarizing the adversary’s last reasons (*anūdyā kathana*). This is done in order to verify that the debaters properly understand their opponents’ positions. If the replica is not preceded by the repetition (*anuvāda*) this is a ground for defeat (*nigrahasthāna*). See also NS V.2.7, 9, pp. 16–17.



VT, before starting the refutation of *mithyātva*, introduces the topic suggesting a few reflections about the nature of the *probandum* (= *mithyātva*) and the main *probans* (= *dṛṣyatva*) of the *mithyātvānumāna*. Beside a brief survey on the five definitions of *mithyātva* quoted *verbatim* from Advaita texts, he summarily cites and refutes some other Advaitins' opinions regarding *mithyātva* (NA 2002, pp. 12–13) and *dṛṣyatva* (2002, p. 13).

The next step is the first definition of falsity. Therein, VT does not repeat the definition by PP already given in the last lines of the introductory section on *mithyātva* (NA 2002, p. 12), but immediately starts attacking Padmapāda's conception of falsity. He wonders how the word *mithyā*—as “assertion of indeterminability” (*anirvacanīyatāvacana*)—should be interpreted. He furnishes three options, pointing out that all of them are flawed.⁷⁵ MS quotes almost *literatim* the first two objections by VT. VT, aware of the Advaitin interpretation of the word *anirvacanīyatā* as different (*vilakṣaṇa*) from real (*sat*) and unreal (*asat*), asks *in primis* if it should be read as the absence of unreality qualified by reality (*sattve saty asattvarūpaviśiṣṭasyābhāvaḥ*)⁷⁶ or if it has two properties (*dharmadvaya*), namely the constant absence of reality (*sattvātyantābhāva*) and the constant absence of unreality (*asattvātyantābhāva*); or again, he argues, if it is the constant absence of unreality qualified by the constant absence of reality (*sattvātyantābhāvavattve sati asattvātyantābhāvavattvarūpam*). NA (NA 2002, p. 14) refutes all these options. In the first case, VT says, according to the dualists' tenets there is a flaw of proving what has already been proved (*siddhasādhana*) because they already maintain that the world is definitely real. The second option is flawed by the mutual contradiction of the two properties involved. Furthermore, there is the ground for defeat (*nigrahasthāna*)⁷⁷ of proving something other than the intended thesis (*arthāntara*). In fac, *brahman* is also devoid of any kind of property such as *sattva* and *asattva*, yet it is not considered false but absolutely real. Similarly, it could be maintained that also in the empirical world there is the constant absence of reality and unreality and, like in *brahman*, these two properties do not contrast with its absolute reality. So the Advaitin wanted to prove the falsity of the world, but finally proved its reality (Sharma 1994, p. 19).

The last part of the second objection is wider and more technical. MS refers to it in a summarized form, just pointing out the more salient tracts.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ The third option is similar to the second one, because it presents the same kind of flaws: mutual contradiction, proving an unintended thesis and weakness of the *probandum* (AS 1997, pp. 49–50): *ata eva na tṛtīyaḥ, pūrvavad vyāghātāt, arthantarāt sādhyavaikalyāc ca iti cet*.

⁷⁶ Ānantakṛṣṇa Śāstrī (AS 1997, p. 92) reads VT's statement in an easier way: *tad hi sattva-viśiṣṭāsattvābhāvo vā ...*

⁷⁷ See fn. 74.

⁷⁸ MS also reports the last section of VT's objection (AS 1997, pp. 49–50): *śūktirūpye abādhyatvarūpasattvavyatirekasya sattve bādhyatvarūpāsattvasya vyatirekāśiddhyā sādhyavaikalyāc ca*. Herein, according to VT, there is the flaw of the weakness of the *probandum* (*sādhyavaikalya*). In the body of the inference the validity of the *probandum* should be seen in the example (*dṛṣtānta*) where it should already be proved (*prasiddha* = *pramāṇasiddha*) by other means of knowledge. The weakness of the *probandum* is when the *probandum* does not occur in the example. In the words “constant absence of reality” (*sattvātyantābhāva*) the meaning of “reality” is “unsublatability” (*abādhyatva*) and its absence is



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1392 NA (2002, p. 14)
 1393 (14) ucyate—mithyātvaṃ hi tvayaiva
 1394 pakṣāntaraṇiṣedhena pañcadhā niruktam.
 1395 **tatrādye kiṃ sattve saty**
 1396 **asattvarūpaviśiṣṭasyābhāvo**
 1397 **'bhipretaḥ? kiṃ vā**
 1398 **sattvātyantābhāvāsattvā-**
 1399 **tyantābhāvarūpadharmadvayam? yad**
 1400 **vā sattvātyantābhāvavattve sati**
 1401 **asattvātyantābhāvavattvarūpaṃ**
 1402 **viśiṣṭam? nādyah, manmate**
 1403 **sadekasvabhāve jagati tasya**
 1404 **siddhatvāt. na dvitīyah, vyāhateḥ,**
 1405 **nirdharmakabrahmavat sattvarāhitye**
 1406 **'pi sadrūpatvenāmithyātvopapat-**
 1407 **tyārthāntaratvāc ca.**

AS (1997, pp. 48–49, 52–55)
 (48–49) nanu kim idaṃ mithyātvam
 sādhayate? na tāvat mithyāśabdo
 'nirvacanīyatāvacanah itī
 pañcapādikāvacanāt
 sadasadanadhikaraṇatvarūpaṃ
 anirvācyatvam. **tad hi kim**
asattvaviśiṣṭasattvābhāvaḥ, uta
sattvātyantābhāvāsattvā-
tyantābhāvarūpaṃ dharmadvayam,
āhosvit sattvātyantābhāvavattve sati
asattvātyantābhāvarūpaṃ viśiṣṭam.
nādyah, sattvamātrādhāre jagaty
asattvaviśiṣṭasattvānabhyupagamāt,
viśiṣṭābhāvasādhane siddhasāadhanāt.
na dvitīyah, sattvāsattvayor ekābhāve
aparasattvāvaśyakatvena vyāghātāt,
nirdharmakabrahmasattvās-
tvarāhitye 'pi sadrūpena amithyātvop-
pattvā arthāntarāc ca.
 (52–55) [...] yac ca—nirdharmakasya
 brahmaṇah sattvarāhitye 'pi
 sadrūpavatprapañcasya
 sadrūpatvenāmithyātvopattvā
 arthāntaram—uktam [...]

1409 MS refers quite faithfully to VT's objection and quotes again *verbatim* the
 1400 technical terms involved. Yet he presents them in a slightly more improved way
 1411 and, to render the reading more comfortable, adds one or two words here and there.⁷⁹

1412 In the second definition VT refers to his comprehensive introduction to the issue
 1413 and does not quote the PPV's definition again but directly proposes his perplexities:

Footnote 78 continued

sublatibility (*bādhyatva*). This sublatibility occurs in the example of the nacre-silver (*śukṭirūpya*), given that there is not the constant absence of unreality/sublatibility because the unsublatibility kind of reality is not present in nacre-silver.

⁷⁹ A difficult case is when, while presenting the first option, VT writes *sattve saty asattvarūpaviśiṣṭasyābhāvaḥ* ("the absence of what is qualified by unreality, given that it is qualified by reality") and MS refers to it in this way *asattvaviśiṣṭasattvābhāvaḥ* ("absence of reality qualified by unreality"). (A *satisaptamī* [= absolute locative] employed within a definition has to be interpreted as a qualifier of the defined entity.) Here, as also shown by Ānantakṛṣṇa Śāstrī (AS 1997, p. 92), MS exactly inverts VT's statement placing the *asattva* as the qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the absence of *sattva*, while for VT it is *sattva* that is the qualification of the absence of *asattva*. However, *asattvaviśiṣṭasattvābhāvaḥ*, though present in all the editions consulted, could also be a typo for *sattvaviśiṣṭasattvābhāvaḥ*. The commentators follow MS's reading, apart from Balabhadra's *Siddhivivākyā* (AS 1997, p. 48), who seems to follow VT.



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1416 NA (2002, p. 22)
 1417 na dvitīyaḥ, **traikālikaniṣedhasya**
 1418 **tāttvikatve 'dvaitahāneḥ.**
 1419 **prātibhāsikatve siddhasāadhanāt.**
 1420 **vyāvahārikatve 'pi tasya bādhyatvena**
 1421 **tāttvikasattvāvirodhitvenārthāntarāt.**
 1422 **advaitaśruter atattvāvedakatvāpātāc**
 1423 **ca. tatpratīyogino 'prātibhāsikasya**
 1424 **prapañcasya pāramārthikatvāpatteś**
 1425 **ca.**

AS (1997, pp. 94–96)
 pratīpannopādhau
 traikālikaniṣedhapratīyogitvaṃ vā
 mithyātvam. **nanu—pratīpannopādhau**
traikālikaniṣedhasya tāttvikatve
advaitahāniḥ, prātibhāsikatve
siddhasāadhanam, vyāvahārikatve 'pi
tasya bādhyatvena
tāttvikasattvāvirodhitayā arthāntaram,
advaitaśruter atattvāvedakatvaṃ ca
tatpratīyoginaḥ prātibhāsikasya
prapañcasya pāramārthikatvaṃ ca
syād iti cet.

1427 Despite the very minor differences of grammatical case changes, here MS quotes
 1428 *verbatim* VT's objections, embedding them in the usual form *nanu ... iti cet.*⁸⁰

1429 All these were just some clues for understanding how and how much MS is
 1430 indebted to VT. Of course, this same *iter* could be proposed for the entire AS.
 1431 Usually at the beginning of every section MS quotes VT almost *verbatim*, or at least
 1432 *ad sensum*. In the rest of the text, MS sometimes responds directly to VT's
 1433 objections and, on other occasions, his replica has an independent structure and
 1434 follows different logical paths.

1435 IV.2 MS and Non-Vedānta Material

1436 In traditional circles, MS is honoured with the title *padavākyapramāṇapraṇīṇa*
 1437 “learned in words (Grammar), sentences (Mīmāṃsā) and means of knowledge
 1438 (Nyāya)” and, consequently, *sarvatantrasvatantra* “one for whom each *śāstra* is as
 1439 if it were his own”, because of the really vast range of quotations and references he
 1440 uses and discusses throughout his works. I have elsewhere (Pellegrini 2014)
 1441 demonstrated how MS used (Navya) Nyāya texts and doctrines in a specific way,
 1442 adapting them to Advaita tenets.

1443 IV.2.1 Padaśāstra: Vyākaraṇa

1444 It is possible (see fn. 13) that among the disciples of MS there was a certain Śeṣa
 1445 Kṛṣṇa, probably the Vaiyākaraṇa *guru* of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. Nonetheless, MS has
 1446 been attacked also from a grammatical point of view. In fact, in his commentary on
 1447 BG, *Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā*, Dhanapati Sūri (end XVIII–beginning XIX cen.) severely
 1448 criticized MS's GAD basing his attacks mainly on philosophical points and on the
 1449 “outrageous” contradiction of the commentary of Śaṅkara. Therein he attacked MS
 1450 in one point (*ad* BG III.28, BG2 1936, pp. 164–165) also on a grammatical basis,
 1451 leaving the idea that MS does not know the fundamentals of such an important
 1452 *śāstra*.

⁸⁰ For the philosophical explanation of the three objections by VT see Pellegrini (2011, p. 445).



Despite Dhanapati Sūri's judgement, MS rightly resorts to grammatical arguments in several circumstances. However, while he directly quotes the aphorisms of Pāṇini, he rarely quotes grammatical commentarial literature, and more frequently he just refers to texts, such as MBh with *Pradīpa*, *Kāśikā* with *Nyāsa* and *Padamañjarī*, etc. When he happens to quote them, he follows NA.

An interesting case can be found in the second *pariccheda* of the AS (1997, pp. 460–465), where MS wants to prove the indivisible efficient and material causality of *brahman* (*abhinnaṇimittopādānakāraṇatva*), whereas the Dvaitins accept the Lord only as the efficient cause of the universe (*nimittakāraṇa*) and not as the material (*upādāna*) one.

In order to prove that the *brahman* is also the material cause of the universe, MS quotes the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (III.1.1: *yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante* “that from which these material elements are generated”) saying that the ablative case (*pañcamī*) attached to the pronoun *yat* is prescribed in the sense of a material cause (*upādānakāraṇa* = *prakṛti*) by the pāṇinian rule I.4.30 *janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ*, “The material cause of the agent of the verb ‘to be born’ [is the *apādāna* (ablative)]”.

According to MS, the efficient causality of the *brahman* is already established by *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI.2.3 and VI.3.2, and it is accepted by both the debaters. In this connection, MS also refers to the third chapter of Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (hereafter JMS, III.3.14) where six means of proof (*pramāṇa*) or rules of interpretation are presented, by means of which the order among actions is fixed. The first two means are the direct statement (*śruti*) and the implicit sense of the words (*liṅga*). MS can accordingly say that the material causality is also proved through the direct statement of the ablative (*pañcamīśruti*) and the sense (*liṅga*) implicit in the last words of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*'s (III.1.1) passage (*yat prayanty abhisamviśanti* “to which they go, into which they dissolve”), which convey the idea that the *brahman* is the substrate (*āśraya*) of conservation (*sthiti*) and annihilation (*laya*) of the universe.⁸¹

Following VT (NA, 2002, p. 947), in order to show that the ablative can be used also for something which is not a material cause, MS quotes an example from a *Vṛtti*, namely *putrāt pramodo jāyate* “from a son originates happiness”. However, the example is not in the *Kāśikāvṛtti* (hereafter KV) but in Jinendrabuddhi's (VII–VIII cen. CE) *Kāśikāvivaraṇapañcikā* or *Nyāsa* (hereafter KV/N; ad PA I.4.30; 1985, p. 191).⁸²

At any rate, this demonstrates to the Dvaitins that the word *prakṛti* in PA does not concern a material cause but merely a simple cause (*hetumātra*). To develop this position, MS also quotes in a *pūrvapakṣa* KV/N on the same passage of KV:

⁸¹ AS (1997, p. 460): ‘*yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*’ iti ‘*janikartur*’ iti sūtraprakṛtyarthavihita-*pañcamīśrutyā* ‘*yat prayanty abhisamviśanti*’ti sthītilayādhāratvaliṅgā copādānatvasiddhiḥ, ‘*tad aikṣata*’ vyākaraṇāñī’ti iṣaṇādyādhāratayā kartṛtvasiddhiś ca.

⁸² I thank Elisa Freschi for kindly providing me this material.



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KV/N ad PA I.4.30 (1985, p. 191)
tatrāsati prakṛtighraṇe pratyāsatter
upādānakāraṇasyaiva syāt, netarasya.
prakṛtighraṇe tu sati sarvasyaiva
kāraṇamātrasya bhavati.

AS (1997, p. 460)
nyāse 'pi idam evāśritya asati
prakṛtighraṇe
upādānasyaivāpādānasamjñā syāt,
pratyāsatter, netarasya.
prakṛtighraṇāt kāraṇamātrasya
bhavatīti prakṛtipadam anupādāne 'pi
apādānasamjñāsiddhyartham ity uktam.

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Here, MS quotes Jinendrabuddhi almost *verbatim*. In the first sentence he inverts the position of two words (*pratyāsatter* and *upādānasya*). He, moreover, deletes from the word *upādāna* the specification *kāraṇa* and he specifies that if the word *prakṛti* is not intended as material cause, then the material cause alone should get the technical appellation of *apādāna*. In writing so, he adds the term *apādānasamjñā* which in KV/V is found two lines earlier, just after the sentence *putrāt pramodo jāyate* but not immediately after *upādānakāraṇasyaiva*. In the second sentence he writes *prakṛtighraṇāt* in ablative instead of the original locative and omits *sarvasyaiva*, which further specifies the compound *kāraṇamātrasya*.

Immediately after this passage MS, again following VT, quotes Patañjali's MBh ad PA I.4.30, modifying the original text:

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MBh (Kielhorn 1985, pp. 329–330)
āyam api yogaḥ śakyo 'vaktum. katham
gomayād vṛściko jāyate.
golomāvilomabhyo dūrvā jāyanta iti.
apakrāmanti tās tebhyaḥ.

AS (1997, p. 760)
mahābhāṣye 'pi 'āyam api yogaḥ śakyo
'vaktum. golomājalomāvilomabhyo
dūrvā jāyante apakrāmanti tās
tebhyaḥ' ityādinā lomādinīnām dūrvādīn
prati avadhītvād 'dhrūvam apāye
'pādānam' [PA I.4.24] ity
anenaivāpādānasamjñāsiddheḥ idam
sūtram anārambhaṇīyam iti sūtram
pratyakhyātam.

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I think that here MS did not look at the original text of MBh but simply quotes VT's statement reproducing it *verbatim*. In fact, beside Patañjali's statement quoted by VT and MS about the lack of necessity of this rule (*yoga*), the first part of the following question, which is meant to defend the legitimacy of Pāṇini's aphorism and without which the sentence "the scorpion is generated from cow dung" could not be explained, is not quoted *verbatim*. The second part of the question presents a minor addition of "the hair of the he-goat" (*ajaloma*) in NA and AS, which does not appear in MBh. The answer, on the other hand, does suffer changes in the quotation, since VT and consequently MS, interprets Patañjali's synthetic statement: "These" (*tāh*) mentioned elements proceed (*apakrāmanti*) from a certain place (*tebhyaḥ*). That place or entity from which they originate and then separate is called *apādāna*, which can be equally expressed with the aphorism *dhrūvam apāye 'pādānam* (PA I.4.24). So, the *sūtra* I.4.30 is not necessary at all.



To corroborate his view, VT goes on to quote the opinion of the commentary on Patañjali, Kaiyaṭa's (XI cen. CE) *Pradīpa* (hereafter MBh/U).

1538	MBh/P (II, 2006, p. 367)	NA (2002, p. 948)	AS (1997, p. 761)
1539	yathā bilād dīrghabhogo	kaiyaṭe 'pi 'yathā bilād	kaiyaṭe 'pi
1540	bhogī niṣkrāmann apy	dīrghabhogo bhogī	apakramaṇāvadhiv
1541	avicchedāt	niṣkrāmann apy	lomādiṣu kāryasya
1542	tatropalabhyate tathā	avicchedāt	saṃbhavatīti āśaṃkya
1543	dūrvā apīty arthaḥ	tatropalabhyate tathā	'bilān niṣkrāmato
		dūrvā apītyādi-	dīrghabhogasya
		nāvadhivam	bhoginaḥ
		evopapāditam. tad uktam	avacchinnatayā
		—śrīgāc charo	tatropalabdhivat
		'vilomabhyo dūrvā	kāryasyāpi dūrvādes
		gomayatas tathā/ vṛścikaś	tatropalabdhir' ity
		cety evam ādyeṣv	avadhivam eva
		apādānatvam iṣyate//	tatropapāditam. ⁸⁴
		iti // ⁸³	

Interestingly, in these passages VT quotes MBh/P exactly *verbatim*, while MS quotes it *ad sensum*, slightly modifying Kaiyaṭa's text.

The reason might be that in general MS avoids too technical grammatical discussions and whenever gets involved with them this happens on safe domains or whenever he is compelled to do so by the *pūrvapakṣin*. As usual in India, the *sūtras* of Pāṇini are always quoted *verbatim*, simply inserting the quotation mark *iti* at their end. This is probably because it was (as it is today) a compulsory requirement for traditional students to learn by heart all the grammatical aphorisms. This is a different case for the grammatical commentarial literature about which MS depends on VT's initiative, even though he exhibits his ability to modify its structure without changing the purport.⁸⁵ Thus, despite the shortcomings evidenced by Dhanapati Sūri, MS shows a certain confidence with *vyākaraṇa* as well.

IV.2.2 Vākyāśāstra: Pūrva Mīmāṃsā

One of the teachers of MS was Mādhava Sarasvatī, probably a disciple of the great Mīmāṃsaka and Vaiyākaraṇa Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa (see above fn. 16, 71).

VKL is mainly intended to explain the true nature of liberation while refuting all other views. The subject is closely connected with Vedic statements and with *śabdapramāṇa* (linguistic communication as instrument of knowledge) in general.

⁸³ Here VT quotes this last passage from Madhva's *Anuvyākhyāna* I.4.71, referring to KV *ad* PA I.4.30.

⁸⁴ Also MS goes on with the discussion referring again to PA I.4.30 and to KV on it.

⁸⁵ Although there are not as many as could be supposed, in MS's works there are many grammatical discussions. Some other revealing examples in AS are concerned with *mithyātvaśrutiyupapattiḥ* (1997, pp. 507–508), *brahmaṇo jñātvyādyupapattiḥ* (1997, p. 753), the quite interesting *tattvamasyādvīkāyārthanirūpaṇam* (1997, pp. 832–834) and *śābdāparokṣatvam* (1997, pp. 876–877); GAD *ad* BG II.18 (2005, pp. 94–95); VKL (1962, pp. 77, 80) etc.



For MS, Bhāṭṭa and Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā are the major authorities on these issues because, like Advaita, they come from a decidedly orthodox *smārta* milieu. This is probably the reason why, though he quotes few Mīmāṃsā passages *verbatim*, MS refers to Mīmāṃsakas' views several times, for instance on the function of the words (VKL 1962, p. 65), *anvitābhīdhānavāda* (1962, pp. 68–69), *abhihitānvayavāda* (1962, p. 69), the meaning potentiality (*śakti*, 1962, pp. 73–74) etc.⁸⁶

More in general, all of MS's works are disseminated by Mīmāṃsā references (see, e.g., the reference to the six *pramāṇas* in the previous chapter). MS mainly quotes aphorisms from JMS, stanzas from ŚV, only a few words from *Śābarabhāṣya*, or alternatively he roughly refers to doctrines treated in *Tāntravārtika* (GAD *ad* BG, 2).⁸⁷

In order to exemplify MS's use of Mīmāṃsā material I will focus on a short part of the first *pariccheda* of AS (1997, pp. 371–380), entitled *pratyakṣasyāgamabādhyatvam* “How direct perception can be invalidated by Sacred Texts”. According to MS, in fact, scriptures can invalidate even direct perception (*pratyakṣa*). By contrast, VT (NA 2002, pp. 138–139) says that if perception is contradicted by linguistic communication, the whole Mīmāṃsā, Pūrva and Uttara will be deprived of its authoritativeness. That is why Jaimini (JMS I.2.2) opposes the independent epistemologic value of this laudative passage (*arthavāda*) “therefore during the day the smoke [arisen] from fire is indeed seen, not the flame” (*Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* II.1.4: *tasmād dhūma evāgner divā dadṛṣe nārciḥ*) and this *mantra* “Aditi is the sky” (*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* I.13.2: *aditir dyaur*). According to Jaimini they cannot be considered valid means of knowledge because in both these passages there is a contrast with vision (*dṛṣṭi*), i.e., direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) (JMS I.2.2: *dṛṣṭivirodhāt*). In order to reply to these points, VT and MS quote two aphorisms by Jaimini (JMS I.2.10: *guṇavādas tu*; I.2.47: *guṇād apratiśedhaḥ syāt*). According to these two statements, the *arthavāda* and the *mantra*, convey their content with a secondary meaning (*gauṇa*) or have an indirect application. In fact, the flame of the fire is not seen during the day because of the distance from which the scene is observed, while the smoke is seen. In the *mantra*, Aditi is simply extolled as everything: the sky, the atmosphere, the mother, father, the son etc. Ergo, both passages are not lacking authoritativeness because they are not actually contradicting perception.⁸⁸ In the same way throughout the string of *sūtras* starting from *tatsiddhiḥ* (JMS I.4.23, *tatsiddhipreṭikā*) the apparent contrariety with direct perception of the Vedic passage “The sacrificer is the bundle of [*kuśā*] grass” (*Taittirīya Saṃhitā* II.6.5.3: *yajamānaḥ prastaraḥ*) has been explained resorting to its

⁸⁶ Actually, all over the discussion beginning from p. 65 and roughly terminating on p. 95 of VKL, MS is strongly indebted to Mīmāṃsā's arguments. In the rest of the texts he mentions Kumārila's *Ślokavārtika* (hereafter ŚV) 114 *ad* JMS I.1.2 (1962, pp. 44–45), ŚV 53 *ad* JMS I.1.2 (1962, p. 130). He quotes also JMS I.1.5 (1962, p. 68) and a stanza quoted in Sucaritamīśra's commentary on ŚV 58 *ad* JMS I.1.1 (1962, p. 75). Thanks to Elisa Freschi for suggesting this translation of *śakti*.

⁸⁷ For example, in VKL (1962, p. 129) MS quotes a few words from *Śābarabhāṣya* (hereafter ŚāB) *ad* JMS I.1.6; in GAD *ad* BG II.20 (2005, pp. 97–98) he seems to refer to *Tāntravārtika ad Śābarabhāṣya* on JMS I.3.2.

⁸⁸ AS (1997, pp. 371–373): *kiṃ ca parīkṣitapramāṇabhāvaśabdabādhyam api pratyakṣam. nanu—pratyakṣam yadi śabdabādhyam syāt tadā jaiminīnā 'tasmād dhūma evāgner divā dadṛṣe nārcir' ityādyarthavādasya 'aditir dyaur' ityādimantrasya ca dṛṣṭavirodhenāpramāṇye prāpte guṇavādas tu 'guṇād apratiśedhaḥ syād' ityādinā gauṇārthatā nocyeta.*



possessing a secondary meaning (*gauṇārthatā*). In fact, if direct perception resulted in being weak or invalid, every perception could be considered useless, because if verbal proof could contradict it, then there would be no more rule for the dignity of any expressed concept whatsoever and every one could say whatever he feels, be it logical or illogical.

What is remarkable in this *pūrvapakṣa* as quoted by MS is the fact that he, differently from VT, mentions the six *sūtras* after *tatsiddhiḥ* (JMA I.4.23–28) in a unique string, possibly in force of their technical appellative *peṭikā*,⁸⁹ which conveys their close mutual relation.

JMS I.4.23–28 (II, 1981, pp. 313, 322, 323, 325, 326) NA (2002, pp. 138–139) AS (1997, pp. 371–373)

tatsiddhiḥ // I.4.23 //	... ‘tatsiddhir’	‘tatsiddhijātisārūpya-
jātiḥ // I.4.24 //	ityāditatsiddhipeṭikāyām	praśaṃsāliṅga-
sārūpyāt // I.4.25 //	ca ‘yajamānaḥ prastara’	bhūmalīṅgasamavāyād’
praśaṃsā // I.4.26 //	ityāder gauṇārthatā	iti tatsiddhipeṭikāyām
bhūmā // I.4.27 //	nocyeta.	‘yajamānaḥ prastara’
liṅgasamavāyāt // I.4.28 //		ityāder gauṇārthatā
		nocyeta.

Apart from the particular quoting mode of MS, the citation is *verbatim*. Here MS does not only refer to VT to treat the issue thoroughly. The variant readings might have occurred because MS quoted these *sūtras* by heart or because he glanced through one of his manuscripts and found such readings.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ The term *peṭikā* applied to these six aphorisms taken together means “basket, small box, small whole”. The term is used by Khaṇḍadeva (XVII cen. CE) in his independent gloss on JMS, the *Mīmāṃsā-kaustubha* (hereafter MK, 1991, pp. 268, 279, 281, 283, 285, 292). Even though I could not find other authoritative *Mīmāṃsaka*s using this term, it seems to me that at the time of VT, and later at the time of MS and Khaṇḍadeva, it was widely accepted. In *Mīmāṃsākośa* (Sarasvatī 1992, p. 2615) we find a reference to many groups of *adhikaraṇas* or *sūtras* called *peṭikā*, among which the *tatsiddhipeṭikā* is also mentioned without adding any information. Also Pārthasārathi Miśra in his *Śāstradīpikā* (ŚD 1988, p. 90) gives in *kārikā* form a final purport for the entire context, even though he does not use the word *peṭikā*: *tad evaṃ tatsiddhijātisārūpyapraśaṃsāliṅgabhūmabhiḥ / ṣaḍbhiḥ sarvatra śabdānām gauṇīvr̥ttiḥ prakalpitā //*

⁹⁰ Also, the next chapter of the first *pariccheda* of AS (*apacchedanyāyavaiśamyabhaṅga* 1997, pp. 382–384) discusses an issue through *Mīmāṃsaka* means. The problem is to deny the difference through the “interpretative maxim of the subsequent sublating the earlier” (*apacchedanyāya*) proposed in JMS VI.5.54 (*paurvāpye pūrvadaurbalyam prakṛtivat*). According to MS affirming that an earlier knowledge is set aside by a subsequent one means that knowledge produced by direct perception or any other means of knowledge is later on sublated by knowledge produced by *śrutipramāṇa*. Before MS, several Advaitins such as Maṇḍana Miśra, Vācaspati, Ānandabodha etc., referred to *apacchedanyāya* in these very terms. AS, dealing with this same issue, quotes also other JMS, such as VI.5.51, VI.5.55 and Kumārila’s *Ṭupṭikā tasya prayogāntare nikṣepaḥ* (Yogīndrānanda NA 2002, pp. 149–150; Nair 1990, pp. 54–55; Sharma 1981, pp. 274–275). See also ŚD (1988, p. 503).

1624 IV.2.3 *Pramāṇasāstra: Nyāya*

1625 At the beginning of this article (see Sect. I) I tried to reconstruct the steps covered
1626 by MS to master Nyāya. Throughout his works we find an echo of his deep insight
1627 into this *śāstra*, mainly in its Navya form. Apart from the definitely Navya style
1628 employed in all of his works, MS resorts several times to Nyāya sources, either the
1629 ancient or the new ones. For example, the two opening sections of AS (1997, pp. 8–
1630 20, 20–48) offer a thorough insight into MS's intimacy with ancient and new Nyāya,
1631 although adapted to Advaita tenets.

1632 In the beginning of AS, MS considers the disagreement sentence (*vipratipat-*
1633 *tivākya*) essential to developing a doubt (*saṁśaya*), which is the basis for
1634 constructing the subject of the inference on which debate is based.⁹¹ On the
1635 contrary, VT, together with Navya Naiyāyikas, does not accept doubt as a
1636 constituent of the property of being an inferential subject or subjectness (*pakṣatā*).
1637 In the following passage MS refers to the view—refuted in VT's *pūrvapakṣa*—
1638 according to which doubt is essential for constructing the subject of the inference
1639 (*saṁśayapakṣatā*), which in an anomalous way starts with a concessive sentence
1640 (*yady api*):
1641

1644 AS (1997, p. 14)
1645 yady api **vipratipattijanyasaṁśayasya**
1646 **na pakṣatāsampādakatayopayogaḥ.**

TCP (1988, p. 3)
na tāvat
sandigdhasādhyadharmavattvaṁ
pakṣatvam.

1648 In this passage, as well as in the following ones, the confidence, both intellectual
1649 and textual, with which MS treats this complex Nyāya issue, becomes apparent. He
1650 does not always quote *verbatim*, but he exactly refers or hints to specific discussions
1651 held in other texts in such a way that once again he reveals his ideal addressee, who
1652 should be able to recall these discussions held somewhere else by means of a clue or
1653 a quotation that is short and right to the point.⁹²

1654 In fact, in the next lines he simultaneously quotes and remarkably summarizes in
1655 a single line the new definition of *pakṣatā* given by Gaṅgeśa, which in Nyāya school
1656 sets aside the hackneyed *saṁśayapakṣatā* definition:
1657

⁹¹ AS (1997, p. 14): *tatra vipratipattijanyasaṁśayasya vicārāṅgatvān madhyasthenādaḥ vipratipattih pradarśaniyā*. See also Pellegrini (2014: 4–9). Accordingly, if one wants to know by inference something already known through *pratyakṣa* or *śruti*, s/he will need, in MS's view, to raise a hypothetical doubt (*āhāryasaṁśaya*).

⁹² For example, the discussion on *pakṣatā* starts, beside the four options given in TC itself, from the very beginning of Nyāya speculation. In fact, we already find its forerunners in Vātsyāyana-Pakṣilasvāmin Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya (hereafter NSBh *ad* NS 1.1.1, 1997, p. 3): *nānupalabdhe na nirṇite 'rthe nyāyah pravartate. kiṁ tarhi? saṁśayite 'rthe*. Some connected passages are also found in NSBh *ad* 1.1.41.



AS (1997, pp. 14–15)
śiṣādhayiṣāviraha-
sahakṛtasādhakamānābhāvarūpāyās
 tasyaḥ saṁśayaḥgṛhaṭitatvāt.

TCP (1988, pp. 64–67)
 ucyate,
śiṣādhayiṣāvirahasahakṛtasādhaka-
mānābhāvo yatra sa pakṣaḥ.⁹³
 ucyate—**śiṣādhayiṣāviraha-**
sahakṛtasādhakapramāṇābhāvo
yatrāsti sa pakṣaḥ. tena
śiṣādhayiṣāvirahasahakṛtaṁ
sādhakapramāṇam yatrāsti sa na
pakṣaḥ. yatra sādhakapramāṇe satī asatī
 vā śiṣādhayiṣā yatra vā ubhayābhāvas
 tatra viśiṣṭābhāvāt pakṣatvam.

MS clearly quotes Gaṅgeśa's definition exactly in Gaṅgeśa's terms and not in the newly shaped version (as in *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* [NSM] *ad Kārikāvalī* [K] II.70), which was also well known by the time of MS, namely *śiṣādhayiṣāviraha-viśiṣṭasiddhyabhāvaḥ pakṣatā*. I think that the structure of the reference, together with the common training among traditional Naiyāyikas to commit to memory the main refined definitions (*pariṣkāra*) of the system (which lasts even up until today) as well as the related discussions, may reveal that MS in this occasion is citing by heart.

Next to this, from *anyathā* onwards (see next table), in the *pūrvapakṣa* MS starts to discuss the flaws (*hāni*) arising from accepting *pakṣatā* in the form of doubt concerning the *probandum*. The sense of the word *anyathā* conveys the problem produced on accepting *saṁśayapakṣatā*, so the alternative implied by it could be paraphrased in this way: “otherwise, if we accept this kind of property of inferential subjectness, according to which the doubt concerning the *probandum* in the inferential subject...”. Consequently, MS makes the opponent say that if someone has realised the self through the teaching of the *śruti* but desires to infer it, he will not be able to formulate this inference because he has already ascertained the self, and so there will be no room for doubt. Additionally, MS here seems to cryptically and silently hint at the second definition of *pakṣatā* refuted by Gaṅgeśa in TC (TCP 1988, pp. 42, 55: *sādhyaśādhakapramāṇābhāvaḥ*, “the absence of means of knowledge establishing the *probandum* is inferential subjectness”)⁹⁴ and more relevantly at the third one (TCP 1988, p. 63; *śiṣādhayiṣitasādhya dharmā dharmī pakṣaḥ*, “the inferential subject is the substrate whose property is the *probandum* which is the object of the desire to infer”).

⁹³ This is the original definition of Gaṅgeśa *śiṣādhayiṣāvirahasahakṛtasādhakapramāṇābhāvo yatra asti sa pakṣaḥ*, “the inferential subject is where there is the absence of the establishing means of knowledge coupled with the absence of the desire to infer”. “Absence” in the latter case hints at the fact that the desire to infer is not absolutely necessary to infer.

⁹⁴ This cannot be the correct definition of inferential subjectness because in certain cases the inference could take place even when there is a positive cognition of the *probandum* (*siddhi*).



AS (1997, p. 15)

anyathā śrutyātmaniścaya-
vato 'numitsayā tadanumānam
na syāt, vādyādīnām niścayavattvena
saṁśayaśambhavād.

TCP (1988, pp. 55–63)

nāpi sādhakapramāṇābhāvaḥ.
'śrotavyaḥ mantavyaḥ
nididhyāsitavya' iti śrutyā samāna-
viśayaśravaṇānantaram
mananabodhanāt, pratyakṣadrṣṭe 'py
anumānadarśanāt, ekalingāv
avagate 'pi līṅgāntareṇa tadanumānāc
ca. 'śrotavyaś śrutivākyebhyo
mantavyaś copapattibhiḥ' iti
smaraṇāt. atha siṣādhayaṣita
sādhya dharmā dharmī pakṣaḥ, tathā hi,
mumukṣoś śabdād ātmāvagame 'pi
mananasya mokṣopayogitvena siddhi-
viśayānumitīcchayātmānumānam.

Regarding the second option, for example, according to Gaṅgeśa, the BrU (II.4.4.6) passage conveys the idea that when the nature of the self is fully ascertained from the statements of the *śruti*, then it could also be proved by inference. This shows that even non-inferentially known objects can, subsequently, also be inferentially known. Similarly, according to the third option, the prescription of the inferential ascertainment of the nature of the self when it is already known through the upaniṣadic statements can be justified. If there is a desire to know the self inferentially, its verbal knowledge cannot prove to be a hindrance to the acquisition of its inferential knowledge. The desire to infer can act as a stimulator of the inferential knowledge. Also, in VKL MS uses Nyāya material three times (1962, pp. 20, 22, 26), mainly from the old school. Interestingly, in the third instance he quotes a moderately long passage from NSBh *ad* I.1.2. *verbatim* (1997, pp. 7–8).

IV.2.4 ARR and Bhedaratna

A final short but due remark on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concerns ARR, which probably represents the last genuine work written by MS. This text is a rebuttal of Śaṅkara Miśra's (XV CE) Bhedaratna. As stated earlier, BR is mainly a reply to the eighth section of the first *pariccheda*, the *Caturvidhabhedakhaṇḍana* (Yogīndrānanda 1992, pp. 96–121) of Śrīharṣa's KKK in specific, and to Advaita in general (Potter 1993, pp. 398–407).

Also in this case, we find a kind of “reverse indebtedness” of MS to Śaṅkara Miśra. As it has been shown for VT vs. AS, here MS also responds point by point to the objections of Śaṅkara Miśra and, therefore, he quotes in his own way several passages from BR, introducing them with a very short explanation and closing them with an analysis and a refutation in his own style. Moreover, as usual in his replies, he transcends the boundaries of the text on which his rebuttal is based and discloses his lucid style and logic.



Just like in NA, this pattern is followed throughout the booklet. As an example, let us examine the first *pūrvapakṣa* of the third section entitled *śrūtīnām bhedaparatvabhāṅgaḥ* (ARR 1927, pp. 39–49; 1917, pp. 3–7):

BR (1927, pp. 1–2)
dehādes tāttvikād bhedaṃ satyaṃ
cātmany ajānatām/ mumukṣūṇām na
mokṣo 'stīty ato bhedo nirūpyate// 3 //
na sā dhīḥ kvacid apy asti yatra bhedo
na bhāsate/ ata eva na tanmānaṃ yatra
bhedapramāpakam// 4 // tathāhi — ‘sa
 hovācāitad vai tad akṣaraṃ gārgi
 brāhmaṇā abhivadanty asthūlam
 anaṇv ahrasvam adīrgham alohitam
 asneham acchāyam atamo 'vāy
 anākāśam asaṃgam arasam agandham
 acakṣuṣkam aśrotram avāg amano
 'tejaskam aprāṇam amukham
 anāmāgotram ajaram amaram
 abhayam amṛtam arajo 'śabdā
 avivṛtam asaṃvṛtam apūrvam
 anaparam anantaram abāhyaṃ, na tad
 aśnāti kiṃcana, na tad aśnoti kaścana’
 [BrU III.8.8] iti
 śrūtānyonyābhāvātmakabhedasyaiva
 nānarthatvāt. tathā ca sthūlaṃ yac
 charīrādi tadbhinnaṃ brahmety
 arthaḥ. evaṃ aṇu yaṇ manaḥ
 tadbhinnaṃ brahmety arthaḥ.

ARR (1927, pp. 39–40; 1917, p. 3)
 atra kaścīd āha, nādvaitajñānaṃ
 muktihetuḥ kintu dehādi-
 pratiyogikabhedajñānam. vadati cātra
 bhedanirūpaṇapratijñāpūr-
 vakabhedasthāpane pramāṇam. tathāhi
 ‘dehādes tāttvikād bhedaṃ satyaṃ
 cātmany ajānatām/ mumukṣūṇām na
 mokṣo 'stīty ato bhedo nirūpyate// 1 //
 na sā dhīḥ kvacid apy asti yatra bhedo
 na bhāsate/ ata eva na tanmānaṃ yatra
 bhedapramāpakam// 2 // ‘sa hovācāitad
 vai tad akṣaraṃ gārgi brāhmaṇā
 abhivadanty asthūlam anaṇv ahrasvam
 adīrgham alohitam asneham acchāyam
 atamo 'vāy anākāśam asaṃgam
 arasam agandham acakṣuṣkam
 aśrotram avāg amano 'tejaskam
 aprāṇam amukham anāmāgotram
 ajaram amaram abhayam amṛtam
 arajo 'śabdā avivṛtam asaṃvṛtam
 apūrvam anaparam anantaram
 abāhyaṃ, na tad aśnāti kiṃcana, na
 tad aśnoti kaścane'ti [BrU III.8.8]
 śrūtāv anyonyābhāvātmakabhedasyaiva
 nānarthakatvāt. tathā ca sthūlaṃ yac
 charīrādi tadbhinnaṃ brahmety
 arthaḥ. evaṃ aṇu yaṇ manaḥprabhṛti
 tadbhinnaṃ brahmety artha ityādi.
 tathā ca bhedajñānād eva kaivalyaṃ iti.

Here, as in the case of NA, MS starts quoting, discussing and refuting BR already from the very incipit, the *maṅgalaśloka*.⁹⁵ This also demonstrates that in the traditional point of view upheld by MS, the benedictory verses were already *in nuce* expressions of certain *siddhāntas* (as in NA and AS, see *infra* IV.1), and consequently subject to a reflection or a refutation just like the rest of the text. Next, MS opens the section with a general statement: someone (*kaścīd*) affirms that the cause of liberation is not the knowledge of non-duality, but a differentiating knowledge which has the body and other constitutive elements as its counterpart

⁹⁵ See also the second section of ARR (1927, p. 37; 1917, p. 2) where he quotes and starts his refutation from the first two *maṅgala* verses of BR.



1765 (*pratiyogika*), namely the knowledge that the self is different from the body, its
1766 faculties etc. MS goes on by saying that on this issue this “someone” furnishes a
1767 proof to establish the difference (*bheda*) preceded by a proposition dealing with this
1768 very difference. From here MS starts quoting *verbatim* the third and fourth
1769 benedictory verses of his opponent along with the entire and exact Upaniṣadic
1770 passages cited by him. Having quoted the long BrU (III.8.8) passage Śaṅkara Mīśra
1771 explains that all the privative *a-* compounded with a series of substantives
1772 expressing qualification or attribute are not to be interpreted in the sense of constant
1773 absence (*antyantābhāva*) but as mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva*). Thus, *a-sthūla*
1774 means that *brahman* is different from the gross body, *a-manas* intends that *brahman*
1775 is different from the atomic sized (*aṇu*) mind, and so on. Here ends the quotation by
1776 MS but Śaṅkara Mīśra further writes a short conclusion in order to clarify the
1777 purport of the entire objection: the final isolation is achieved through the knowledge
1778 of difference and not, as Advaitins maintain, by realising an identity or the non-
1779 duality.⁹⁶

1780 V Conclusions

1781 This article should be intended as a historical and philosophical reconstruction
1782 rather than a philological one. Although still incomplete, I have tried to show some
1783 of the possible routes for researching MS's works. I hope to elaborate in the future
1784 the points I could not touch herein and develop the topics I just mentioned in
1785 passing. In fact, MS, even though this tendency seems to be slowly reversing, has
1786 not been studied sufficiently in comparison with his pivotal role in pre-modern
1787 brahmanical philosophy. First of all, there are some texts attributed to him available
1788 only in manuscript form. Moreover, apart from the untiring effort done in the first
1789 decades of the last century by illustrious exceptions, such as Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstrī, at
1790 present MS's works are not accessible in critical editions.

1791 MS's knowledge of Sanskrit textual tradition is really remarkable. Throughout
1792 his production he quotes, refers, hints to, and mentions, acknowledgingly or not, a
1793 very wide range of Indian literary production: taken from Vedic lore, along with
1794 *Upaniṣads* and more common *Samhitā* passages, he quotes also from lesser-known
1795 texts, such as *Brāhmaṇa* and *Āraṇyaka* literature. He also demonstrates a deep

⁹⁶ A chapter apart would require MS's use of multifarious material from Yoga, Advaitic-Yoga (see also Gupta 2006, pp. 47–48), and Śaṅkha, on the same path of earlier Advaita *ācāryas*, mainly Vidyāraṇyamuni. Even though this is a considerably debated issue, this same tendency of MS has been seen since the earliest manifestations of Advaita, from the controversial *Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivarāṇa* to the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* (some would say even in Bhartṛhari) etc. Moreover, this is still present in śaṅkarian milieu where the Advaita Vedānta seems inseparably mixed with the cult of Śrīvidyā. Even if MS clears up the issue that Yoga is not indispensable for the realization of Advaita's liberation (GAD ad BG VI.29), he thoroughly uses yogic material while commenting on three chapters of BG, in his GAD IV, V and VI. Mainly in the VI chapter of GAD he quotes several aphorisms from the *Yogasūtra* and some parts of the *Īyāsabhāṣya*, connecting and interpreting them through the looking glass of Advaita Vedānta. Worthy of mention is also the detailed and long discussion in VI chapter of the seven stages of knowledge, *yoga* or *jñānasaptabhūmikā* (GAD ad BG VI.35–43; 2005, pp. 355–371), where he uses material from Gauḍapāda, Sureśvara, *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, Vidyāraṇya, etc. (see also GAD ad III.18; 2005, pp. 183–185).



knowledge of epic and purāṇic texts, Dharmaśāstra, *āstika* and *nāstika darśanas*, as well as thorough insight into devotional literature. By contrast, I did not see any quotations from tantric material.

It is perhaps possible to trace a common matrix for certain subjects of debate, selected quotations and expressions or at least a common methodology, in pre-modern Advaita texts, which seems to share a common traditional network of ideas and reference works (see Doctor for the comparable case of Nyāya, Sect. 6.1.1) using similar style, vocabulary, question-answers, quotations and references. This also indicates that in the intellectual circles there was a common cultural background and that they shared the same interlanguage (see Freschi, Introduction, Sect. 3). It should also be remembered that one of the “duties” of the hermeneutical “living tradition” is to identify the hidden points of a text and analyse them. Hence, a wide philosophical *Weltanschauung* is the unavoidable background for any reader. That’s why unacknowledged quotations were simply be recognized by the readers (Doctor, Sect. 3.2). Maybe in some occasions only a clue (*saṃketa*, *jñāpaka*) was sufficient in order to recall an entire philosophical discussion for the reader. A basic knowledge of the doctrines of each school becomes compulsory to take the major advantage out of this dialogue between the texts and its reader (Doctor, Sect. 5). This common way of presenting the points of view and argumentations was widely spread among the Advaitins of MS’s time.

In this regard, it is worth remembering that in a traditional *śrauta* environment like that of the Advaitins of pre-modern Vārāṇasī, to quote earlier authorities of one’s own *darśana* was not only felt as a tool to dignify the work, but also a compulsory step in order to corroborate one’s own views. Advaitins are often proud of their direct upaniṣadic affiliation and claim for themselves the same non-human unsystematic structure of *śruti*. In fact, they claim to stand in a privileged position within the Indian philosophical panorama, because every other *darśana* finds its sublimation in Advaita. The Advaitins believe themselves to be the only legitimate interpreters of *śruti* and specifically of the *Upaniṣads*. Especially in the earlier phases of the system, the absence of systematic character proper of the *Upaniṣads* is transferred also into the commentarial literature of the *darśana*. This adherence to the model is seen by the Advaitins as a conscious choice, which, according to their view, makes Advaita even nearer to the primordial non-systematic character of the *apauruṣeya* Veda. For this reason they consider their own point of view a direct interpretation and sometimes even an emanation of the intellectual peak of the Veda. According to Advaita every idea is already essentially contained in the Sacred Scripture, so the hermeneutical ability and introspective capacity of the exegete just brings a concept to light. Nonetheless, the skill of this exegete is not left alone, because he is a “ring” of the master-disciple “chain”. The individuality of the single interpreter dissolves in the impersonality of his own tradition, which Advaitins regard as beginningless (*anādi*) and uninterrupted (*avicchinna*). This, I think, could be a reason why Advaitins did not feel the need to acknowledge the borrowing of any ideas from other Advaitins, because for them the unique, true and inexhaustible source is nothing but *śruti*.

This is also the reason why in the majority of the cases, it is even difficult to speak of *sacrum furtum*, because, as far as MS is concerned, he usually



acknowledges all the directly cited passages. When he does not mention the name of a certain author or of his work, he opens the passage with expressions like *tad uktam*, *etad ucyate* etc. or closes them in the most classical way with *iti*, *ityādi*, *ity uktam*, etc., or similar “quotation markers” (Freschi, Introduction, Sect. 3.2 and 5), underlining that he is citing from a source that, I guess, should be familiar to the reader. Furthermore, when MS explicitly quotes, he does so *verbatim et literatim*. Conversely, when he refers to some discussion he mentions a certain passage more *ad sensum*.

Many of the examined cases are inserted into *pūrvapakṣas* because MS is replying to the objections of VT. Therefore, he reports the quotation of the *prima facie* view and then, while answering, he gives his own interpretation of the passage. This is exactly the subject of the last section, where I tried to understand how far MS is indebted to VT's NA. In Sect. IV.1 I noticed what I called a “reverse indebtedness” of MS towards VT, even if I estimate it much less than is normally supposed. In fact, MS reports NA but not always *verbatim*. Sometimes he does so *ad sensum*, nonetheless usually following the style and precisely using the same key terms of VT. In these occasions, where we also find the classical formulas *na ca ... vacyam*, *nanu ... iti cet* etc. several times, he does not need explicit “quotation markers” because he puts every argument of VT in the *pūrvapakṣa* and thus leaves it to the well-trained reader to find it in NA. The replies are independent of VT. Their striking feature is that MS not only tellingly answers to VT, but simultaneously defends and harmonizes earlier *ācāryas'* views. So, we feel the need of MS to reply to all the objections of VT on one side, and on the other the independent structure of his replica, which follows a different logical path.

As for MS's use of other *śāstras*, I observed that while dealing with Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya MS is less attached to literal quotations and just mentions well-known argumentations through evident references, such as definitions or discussions on these definitions. His knowledge and re-use of Navya Nyāya material is absolutely perfect, which is probably one of the reasons which enhanced MS's authoritativeness and efficacy. He also shows, however, a remarkable expertise in grammar and Mīmāṃsā from which he uses hermeneutical tools and profusely quotes *verbatim*. Interestingly, he very rarely, almost never, takes the name of his opponent but by quoting *literatim* from his text he resorts to the cultural background of his readers.

If observing the contemporary traditional attitude towards research material we can, at least, extract a pale echo of how MS dealt with the material at his disposal,⁹⁷ I suggest that in several situations the minor differences are due to the fact that MS is quoting texts committed to memory. I am also convinced that “behind his desk” MS had a sensible manuscript library and he was even interested in searching for

⁹⁷ The entire volume *The Pandit. Traditional Scholarship in India* (and especially the two articles by Ashok Aklujkar) is a really useful survey on the figure and the functions of the Indian man of letters. As for the way paṇḍits dealt with texts, in his introduction Michaels (2001, p. 11) quotes an interesting report produced by the Sanskrit Commission of the Government of India in 1958: “A Pandit, who devotes about 15 or 20 years to study a particular sastra or a group of allied subjects, generally becomes a master of his subject. His knowledge is precise and ready; there is no fumbling or hesitancy about him. He does not need notes, not even books, for expounding the text.”



and going through rare or unusual texts, as proven by the quotations from Ānandapūrṇa Munīndra, an important South Indian author nearly forgotten by Advaita opponents.

Last, MS is perfectly inserted in his period, when innovation was not for its own sake, but used to widen, deepen and improve earlier tradition, which was still kept in the highest consideration.

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